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After the October Crash, index futures markets 
par t i cu la r ly arouse the interes t of academicians and 
regulators. This thesis aims to explore several 
aspects of the Hang Seng Index (HSI) Futures market 
of Hong Kong, including dynamic efficiency, price 
vo l a t i l i t y and margin policy of the futures exchange. 
If an index futures market serves the role of 
hedging well, the cash market and index futures 
market should act as one market by the ac t iv i ty of 
arbi t rageurs . In addition, conventional wisdom t e l l s 
us that futures markets disseminate information much 
fas te r than cash markets f so the former can play a 
price discovery role . In the context of cointegration 
and error-correct ion model, i t i s found that futures 
contracts were not priced e f f i c i en t ly before the 
October Crash. However, since then, both markets 
function coherently and arbitrage ac t iv i t i e s have 
ensured that the two are closely linked. Hence, 
pricing eff iciency has improved. This phenomenon may 
be due to excessive speculation before the Crash, 
while re la t ive ly more mature pract i t ioners , mainly 
ins t i tu t iona l investors, stayed in the market a f t e r 
the Crash. Meanwhile, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, HSI futures do not lead the cash price, but 
rather , the cash market acts as the source of 
information in predicting the movements of futures 
pr ice . 
Since both markets move largely in unison, the 
futures market may destabil ize the cash market by the 
so-called "spillover e f fec t" . However, i t is 
discovered that HSI futures tradings seem to lower 
the cash market's vo l a t i l i t y , not increase i t . This 
i s consistent with Grossman (1988) suggestions, who 
maintains that an active futures market increases the 
depth of the underlying cash market. 
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The th i rd part of th is thesis study margin 
policy. After the Crash, the Futures Exchange was 
blamed for lax margin management and some even 
proposed to increase. the margin level in order to 
curb speculative ac t i v i t i e s (Excess Volat i l i ty 
Hypothesis) • We find that the probability of 
exhaustion of margin level was the highest before the 
Crash when comparing with i t s h is tor ica l value. 
Afterwards, the Futures Exchange has pursued a more 
conservative behavior in margin set t ing. The fact 
that i t could withstand adverse trading condition 
during the period of Tiananmen Incident and the Gulf 
War shows that the Exchange has become more mature in 
i t s r isk management. On the other hand, we cannot 
provide evidence supporting the Excessive Volat i l i ty 
Hypothesis. Therefore, the authority should be 
cautious in raising margin level since increasing 
margin may lower the l iquidi ty of the futures market, 
which in turn increases, rather than decreases the 
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Chapter 1.工ntrnd”r^i rm 
In 1986, the beginning of a major bull market 
around the world equity market, a financial futures 
contract based on Hang Seng Index was introduced in 
Hong Kong. At that time, the Hong Kong stock market, 
along with other world equity markets, have been on a 
strong uptrend. The Hang Seng Index (HSI) moved from 
2540 points on 2 January 1986 to an a l l time high of 
3950 on 1 October 1987, a 55% increase in ten months。 
Owing to the character is t ics of HSI futures contract 
- l o w transaction cost and high leverage - the index 
futures market a t t racted a lot of speculators with 
strong r e t a i l elements and recorded a similar strong 
uptrend during that period. In May 1986, i t s trading 
volume was 31070 contracts, and by September 1987, 
601005 contracts were traded, an increase of nearly 
2000% in 17 months. 
However, nightmare began on October 19, 1987. On 
that day, the world
1
s stock markets dropped 
dramatically. US stock prices, as measured by the S&P 
500 index, declined by 21 percent. Hong Kong was not 
immune, with the HSI fa l l ing by 420.8 points on the 
same day. In order to ref ra in from the influence of 
foreign markets, the Chairman of the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange (SEHK) declared that trading for the rest of 
the week was to be suspended. Following the decision 
of SEHK, the Hong Kong Futures Exchange Ltd. (HKFE) 
also decided to suspend trading of the HSI futures 
contracts" for the same period. Problem then surfaced. 
I t was revealed that many futures brokers with long 
posi t ions were unable to put up further margins 
because c l ien ts walked away from their commitments. 
The Chairman of the Hong Kong Futures Guarantee 
Corporation,(FGC) pointed out that , unless additional 
resource was provided, the FGC would have no choice 
but to cease writing guarantees, leading to the 
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closure of the HKFE. After a serious consideration, a 
support package of $2 b i l l ion loans was provided by 
the Government over the weekend of 24/25 October. On 
26 October 1987, the SEHK and HKFE reopened. The HSI 
plunged 1120 points to close at 2242, a 33% f a l l , in 
the HSI futures market, a temporary ruling was 
imposed banning a l l se l l ing except for liquidation, 
a n d t h e
 deposit for each contracts was raised from 
$10000 to $25000. Spot month contract plunged to 1975 
points, a drop of 1544 or 44% of the spot month. 
In the l ight of the record f a l l during the day, 
the FGC once again could not meet i t s obligation, an 
addit ional $2 b i l l ion support was provided for FGC. 
This supportive fund ensured the operation of FGC 
even if HSI had dropped to the 1000 level . 
For the days following the crash, index futures 
and stock index prices s t i l l fluctuated widely. On 16 
November 1987, the Governor of Hong Kong appointed 
the Securi t ies Review Committee to review the 
operation and regulation of the Hong Kong Stock and 
Futures Exchanges and thei r regulatory bodies. 
Subsequent reforms of the Hong Kong Stock and Futures 
were then undertaken. 
In the aftermath of October 1987, the Futures 
Market was par t icu lar ly accused of contributing to 
the i n s t ab i l i t y of the underlying equity market and 
even causing the crash. At the time when the 
Securi t ies Review Committee -iield i t s hearings, there 
was considerable pressure to close down the index 
futures market altogether. 
Primarily, the cr i t icism of the index futures 
market may be due to the widely held impression that 
the low transaction cost and low margin requirement 
of the HSI futures contracts a t t racted many less 
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informed traders , result ing in the futures market 
inherently more vola t i le than the cash market. As the 
cash and futures markets would essent ial ly function 
as one market by the ac t i v i t i e s of arbitrageurs f the 
v o l a t i l i t y in the index futures market could then 
spi l lover to the cash market. 
Because the above arguments are so forceful, 
many people proposed that the margin requirement of 
futures contracts should be increased to curb 
speculative ac t i v i t i e s . Daily trading hal ts in the 
index futures market y such as price l imits and 
posit ion l imi ts were also suggested to maintain the 
normal inter-market pricing relat ion. Since 
regulatory interference with the markets may entail 
potent ia l costs, the actual relat ions should be 
iden t i f i ed f i r s t before implementing regulatory 
policy. 
With the above backgrounds, th is thesis aims to 
study several related questions of the HSI futures 
market, which are the main concerns of academicians 
and regulators a f t e r the October Crash. 
The f i r s t is to examine whether HSI futures 
market performs i t s designated role well enough to 
j u s t i f y i t s existence. I t is well known that the main 
role of the futures market is r isk t ransfer , and the 
benef i ts of f inancial futures contracts depend on how 
well the secur i ty ,s cash price follows the futures 
price • Hence, the Dynamic EMiciency - the lead/lag 
relat ionships between the HSI and HSI futures prices 
- will be estimated. This estimation allows us to 
see whether the two markets ef fect ively function as 
one market, and to conclude whether the futures 
market serv.es i t s economic function. Moreover, the 
study on lead/lag relationships can also shed light 
on information transmission between the two markets 
3 




 on the local markets only 
employs the VAR method and covers the period from 6 
May 1986 to 27 Feb 1989. As the analysis neglects the 
a rb i t rage l ink - the basis , which can have 
s ign i f i can t e f f ec t on the causal re lat ionship between 
the two markets, the inference may be inval id. In 
t h i s way, we analyze th i s problem in the context of 
cointegrat ion and Error-Correction Model of Granger 
and Engle (1987), which exp l i c i t l y take into account 
of the impact of the basis on the lead/lag 
re la t ionsh ip between the two markets. The data 
employed are HSI daily closing prices and HSI futures 
dai ly sett lement pr ices , spanning from 6 May 1986 to 
31 Dec 1993. 
I t i s found that before the Crash, the futures 
market and cash market did not act as one market as 
they were not cointegrated. In fact , since the 
introduct ion of th i s new type of investment 
instrument, the futures market was over-speculated 
and e f f i c i e n t pricing of the futures contracts could 
not be achieved. But a f t e r the Crash, the less 
informed speculators were eliminated from the futures 
market and the pricing ef f ic iency was improved. The 
two markets were linked by arbi t rage forces and acted 
as one market. For the price discovery role, i t was 
played by cash market, not the futures market in the 
period a f t e r the Crash. The - r e su l t s were similar in 
the period a f t e r the Tiananmen incident, except that 
there was feedback between the two markets with the 
cash market leading the futures market in a more 
pronounced way. Lastly, over the whole period, the 
two markets： were consistent with weak-form eff ic iency 
as past movements of respective markets were not 
1
 See G.Y.N.Tang et al. (1992). 
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useful in predicting future price movements in both 
markets . 
Nevertheless, if the two markets move largely in 
unison, i t will render the opportunity for vo l a t i l i t y 
spi l lover from the futures market to the cash market. 
Since opponents of the index futures market ins is t 
that stock index futures are a gambling instrument 
which fuels a speculative gambling, the second issue 
工 will invest igate is Price Vola t i l i ty , i . e . , whether 
index futures trading causes the cash market to be 
more vo l a t i l e . In the l i t e r a tu re , both theoretical 
and empirical, th is controversial issue remains 
unset t led. Some argue that the futures market 
des tabi l izes the cash market, while some claim that 
futures trading increases the depth of the cash 
market. Therefore, th is issue deserves further 
s tudies. 
Most of the research on th i s issue mainly focus 
on the comparisons of the stock price vo l a t i l i t y 
before and a f t e r the introduction of index futures 
market. As these comparisons are analogous to event 
study with a sample of one, other factors variations 
may render the conclusions invalid. In this way, we 
t ry to supplement more specif ic t es t s by estimating 
the e f fec t s of futures trading ac t iv i t i e s on the 
index vo l a t i l i t y . Index vo l a t i l i t y is estimated by 
the procedure introduced by Schwert (1990). HSI and 
stock market turnover from 2 July 1985 to 31 Dec 
1993, and HSI futures trading volume and open 
in te res t from 6 May 1986 to 31 Dec 1993 are ut i l ized 
in th i s study. The trading ac t i v i t i e s are decomposed 
into three components - the moving average' expected 
and unexpected parts - in order to examine thei r 
respective e f fec t s on the stock market^volatili ty. 
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Above a l l , we find that HSI futures trading 
seems to increase the depth of the cash market, 
ra ther than decreasing i t . Besides, i t seems that the 
v o l a t i l i t y of cash market i s re lated to the futures 
contract l i f e cycle - vo l a t i l i t y increases as the 
expirat ion day comes near. But the evidence is not 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y s igni f icant . 
The l a s t issue to be examined in th is thesis is 
the Margin Policy of Futures Exchange. I t involves 
the management behavior of margin set t ing and the 
re la t ionship between the i n i t i a l margin and futures 
market v o l a t i l i t y . 
I t i s well known that the f inancial in tegr i ty of 
the futures market re l i e s to a large extent on the 
guarantee by the clearing House, which assumes the 
r i sk of the fa i lure of other pa r t i e s . I t s power to 
withstand r isk res ts upon the net worth of the 
Exchange Guarantee Fund, i t s i n i t i a l margin payments 
from contract buyers and se l l e r s , and the strength 
and power of the Clearing House in margin set t ing. 
However, the October Crash revealed that the HKFE did 
not perform well in the i r r i sk management. One can 
see the following comments from the Securit ies Review 
Report: 
“•••it i s important not to lose sight 
of the fact that r e t a i l investors were 
encouraged by the discounted margin 
-‘requirements. " (pp, 15^ 7) 
‘‘•••the underlying case of Hong Kong' s 
unique experience of the October 
collapse was poor r isk management and 
lax credit controls in both 
markets，，(pp.158) 
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In view of the above comments,工 will f i r s t 
invest igate the management behavior of margin set t ing 
of HKFE by computing the probabili ty of exhaustion of 
margin level from the period 6 May 1986 through 31 
Dec 1993. By comparing the h is tor ica l probability 
estimation with d i f ferent intervals , we discover that 
the claim that the underlying cause of Hong Kdng' s 
unique experience of the October Crash was poor risk 
management has i t s j u s t i f i ca t ion . The probability of 
exhaustion of the margin level is the highest before 
the Crash. After th i s incident, the Futures Exchange 
seems to be more conservative in margin sett ing and 
more mature in r isk management. 
Secondly, the relationship between margin 
requirement and futures vo l a t i l i t y will be unearthed. 
Futures markets are regarded as inherently more 
vo la t i l e due to the low margin level a t t ract ing many 
noise traders to the market. Some then recommend that 
i n i t i a l margin should be raised to curb speculative 
a c t i v i t i e s . However, increasing the cost of trading 
will reduce l iquid i ty , leading to be more d i f f i cu l t 
for the market to perform i t s r isk t ransfer role. So 
the actual relat ionship should be ident if ied f i r s t . 
The study here uses event-study approach and Schwert 
(1990) technique to examine the issue. HSI i n i t i a l 
margin requirements and HSI futures daily settlement 
prices from 6 May 1986 to 31 Dec 1993 are employed. 
The findings here suggest that margin 
requirement is not a useful policy to remove 
speculative trading. We cannot find an inverse 
relat ionship between margin requirement and futures 
price vo l a t i l i t y . In fact , the authority should be 
cautious in se t t ing requirement because increasing 
margin levei may not reduce vo l a t i l i t y , but increase 
i t owing to diminishing l iquid i ty of the market. 
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Above a l l , the HSI futures is a forerunner among 
the Pacif ic Asia-Basin countries. However, there have 
been r e l a t ive ly few studies on the local stock index 
futures market. Hope that my research on the three 
aspects of the HSI futures market (Dynamic 
Efficiency, Price Vola t i l i ty and Margin Policy) would 
enable the public to have a deeper understanding on 
these perspectives and help to clear away thei r 
misconception about the HSI Futures market. 
The schedule of th i s thesis i s as follows： 
Chapter 2. will introduce the HSI Futures market 
while Chapter 3, 4 & 5 will investigate in deta i l the 
issues of Dynamic Efficiency, Price Vola t i l i ty and 
Margin Policy of HSI futures market respectively. 
Conclusion will be given in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter_2^_Introduction to the HSI Futures 
Market 
The trading of commodities futures contracts has 
a long his tory in the US. These futures contracts 
allow hedgers to refra in from loss resulted from 
f luctuat ions of prices by buying and sel l ing futures 
contracts . This r isk t ransfer function allows the 
economy to run smoothly. In 1982, a dramatic and 
innovative futures contract based on the movements of 
the stock index was launched by the Kansas City Board 
of Trade - the Value Line Index Contracts. The 
success of the contracts trading immediately incurred 
many imitators , such as the Standard and Poor' s 500 
index futures . 
Hong Kong is one of the forerunners in futures 
trading in the Pacific-Basin region. I t established 
i t s commodity futures exchange in 1976, and began 
trading in cotton futures in May 1977. Afterwards, 
sugar futures , soy bean futures and gold futures 
s ta r ted trading respectively in November 1978, 
November 1979 and August 1980. However, except sugar 
futures which enjoyed high trading volume as 
in ternat ional in teres t developed, the other futures 
markets did not a t t r ac t enough support from either 
local or international in te res t . 
On May 6 1986, the Hong Kong Futures Exchange 
Ltd. (HKFE) introduced a new type of contract - the 
Hang Seng Index Futures - to^-the local economy. Once 
i t s t a r t ed trading, due to the bul l ish sentiment of 
the f inancial market at that time, the trading volume 
of th i s f inancial futures contracts skyrocketed. 
Table 2.1 summaries the trading ac t iv i t i e s of a l l 
types of futures contracts traded on the Hong Kong 
Futures Exchange. However, the HSI futures market was 
mainly composed of small r e t a i l elements and was 
9 
almost wholly speculative at that time. The 
speculative bubble came to i t s climax before the 
October Crash 1987. Then the bubble burst suddenly on 
October 19, 1987. At that time, the Futures market 
faced i t s most d i f f i cu l t time as the c l ients ran away 
from the i r obligation. The Clearing House could no 
longer guarantee the good fa i th of the contracts 
traded and FE nearly went bankruptcy and on the rim 
of closing down. With the Government's rescue 
package, the storm calmed down at l a s t . However, 
investors
1
 confidence lost and the trading ac t iv i t i e s 
languished, the daily trading volume recorded only 
1000 contracts in 1989 when compared with i t s a l l 
time high of over 10000 contracts traded before the 
Crash. 
Because of the Crash, there is an impression 
that the HSI Futures market is simply a gambling 
place. People ignore HSI futures market
1
s v i t a l 
economic role - r isk t ransfer . 
The Hang Seng Index (HSI) , a Laspeyere type 
index using the market capi ta l izat ion and i t s 33 
consti tuent shares
1
 as weight, is designed to ref lec t 
overall stock movement in the Hong Kong Stock Market 
and i s defined as： 
Current Total Market Value of Constituent Stocks * 100 
Total Market Value of Constituent Stocks at Base 
Date 
His tor ica l ly , HSI constituent stocks account for 75% 
of market capi ta l izat ion and far more than 70% of the 
market ac t iv i ty . So a portfol io equivalent to the HSI 
wil l perform in l ine with the Hong Kong stock market. 
This por t fq l io eliminates non-systematic r isk, but 
1 Of these 33 constituent shares, 4 are in the finance sector, 6 in the utilities, 9 in the 
properties, and 14 in the commerce and industry. 
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not the market/systematic r i sk . However, an investor 
holding a Hong Kong stock por t fol io may maintain the 
value of the por t fol io from market fluctuation by 
se l l ing an appropriate number of futures contracts.
2 
Hence, capi ta l loss by adverse stock price movement 
can be compensated by the gain on Futures contracts. 
〇f course, how well the HSI futures can hedge the 
market r i sk depends on how well the HSI futures price 
tracks the HSI price. 
In fac t , since HSI and HSI Futures both 
represent a claim against the same assets, the two 
prices should not diverge too much. The basis, [Ft -
I t ] / established by the cost of carry model
3
, defines 
a range for which arbitrage happen. The upper bound 
i s determined by some minimum acceptable rate of 
return plus the cost of carry. This derives from 
t raders ' being able to lock in a return by borrowing 
and buying the HSI stocks while simultaneously 
se l l ing HSI futures. The cost of carry represents net 
t ransact ion costs and is equivalent to sum of 
financing and direct transaction costs less dividends 
received on the stocks. The lower bound equals some 
threshold borrowing rate less the cost of carry 
established from sel l ing stocks and buying HSI 
futures contracts. Hence, the cost of carry equals 
net financing costs plus dividends owed on the 
borrowed stocks. The normal non-arbitrage price 
re la t ion at time t can be characterized by:. 
L t < [F t 一工 t ] < Ut (1) 
2por instance, a investor buys a market portfolio of stock which worth $2500000 at the 
beginning of March and intend to keep it til the end of the month. In order to refrain from 
capital loss, he then sells 20 contracts at the price of 2500. On 31 March, the market declines 
10%，which means the portfolio only worth $2250000. Meanwhile, he close his position in 
futures market by buying 20 contracts at the price of 2250. On the whole, he does not loss by 
sticking his portfolio value. 
3
 See Cornell and French (1983). 
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where L t and Ut represent the lower and upper bounds 
respect ively. 
If the basis deviates from the upper or lower 
bound, arbi trageurs will exploit th is r iskless 
opportunity by buying or se l l ing futures, combined 
with t ransact ion on physical stocks. For example, 
suppose the basis exceeds the upper bound, the 
expected return to traders from buying stocks and 
se l l ing HSI futures exceeds the threshold return so 
that t h i s arbi t rage is e f fec t ive . Subsequently, the 
basis again f a l l s within the non-arbitrage bounds as 
futures and index prices move closer toward each 
other. Similarly, when the basis f a l l s below the 
lower bound, traders can se l l stocks and buy futures 
un t i l (1) holds. Note, since short-sel l ing is 
prohibited in Hong Kong, the lower bound arbitrage 
can only be effect ive if the investor physically owns 
the stock por t fo l io or borrows stocks to sale. In 
th i s way, stock borrowers have to deposit the 
proceeds for shor t -se l l ing stocks, plus some extra 
margin to the stock lenders as co l la te ra l . 
Besides hedging and arbitrage, there is another 
type of trading existing in the futures market -
speculation. Many hold the impression that 
speculation i s undesirable as i t leads to ins tab i l i ty 
of the underlying market. However, speculation can 
benef i t to the market as i t s existence allows the 
market to be more l iquid, and hence easier to perform 
i t s economic role - r isk t ransfer . Speculators enter 
into the futures market because of the lower 
t ransact ion cost and the high leverage of the futures 
contracts . 
The transaction cost (per - side), for trading a 
HSI futures contract i s HK$17.5 for members of the 
Hong Kong Futures exchange Ltd. I t includes Exchange 
12 
levy (HK$9.5), special levy (HK$5.0), Securities and 
Futures Commission levy (HK$2.5), and Futures 
Compensation Fund levy (HK$0.5) • The minimum 
commission charged by the brokers to their cl ients i s 
set by the HKFE, which is HK$60 for day traders and 
HK$100 for overnight t raders . The transaction cost 
for trading stocks, is based on the value of the 
t ransact ion. The cost (per - side) includes a 
brokerage commission (0.25%) , stamp duty (0.25%), 
Exchange levy (0,025%) , and special levy (0.03%). 
When the HSI futures is at a level of 9000 points, 
the value of each contract i s HK$450000, for the 
value of each index point is HK$50. The round - t r i p 
transaction
4
 cost for trading a contract overnight is 
HK$235 or 0.05% of the value of the contract. On the 
other hand, the round - t r i p transaction cost for 
trading a stock portfol io is 1.11%. Therefore, the 
t ransact ion cost for trading HSI futures is 
subs tant ia l ly lower than that of trading stocks. In 
addition, the HSI futures market provides a high 
leverage instrument for investors. Investors only 
need to deposit an i n i t i a l margin of HK$50000
5
 to 
i n i t i a t e the trading, which is only 11.1% of the 
value of the contract, when the HSI futures at the 
level of 9000 points. Thus, the characteris t ics of 
the futures market (high leverage ra t io and low 
transact ion cost) make i t a t t r ac t ive to speculators 
who bet on the overall movement of the stock market. 
When one wants to buy or se l l HSI futures 
contracts； he is required to--make an i n i t i a l margin 
deposit
6
 • This futures margin is l ike a good fa i th 
securi ty deposit that serves as col la teral for the 
contract commitment. Every posit ion is marked to 
market at the close of each business day. This means 
•
 1 1
 _ v 
4
 Round - trip transaction involves a buy and a sell. 
5
This amount is pertinent only to the members of the Futures Exchange. The non-member 
traders may be requested to deposit more than this amount in their brokers' accounts. 
6
The initial margin is determined by Futures Exchange and ClearingHouse. 
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that a f t e r a contract is bought or sold and the 
i n i t i a l margin deposited, net gains or losses 
resul t ing from any fluctuation in the index value of 
the contract are calculated daily and credited to, or 
debited against the investor 's account. Investors are 
allowed to withdraw the gain above the i n i t i a l margin 
from the i r accounts. However, if the margin deposits 
f a l l below the maintenance margin level, which is 70% 
of the i n i t i a l margin reqiiirement, investors are 
required to replenish their accounts to the i n i t i a l 
margin level . Otherwise, the i r position will be 
closed. 
If a posit ion is held unt i l expiry, the index 
and futures prices converge, buyers
1
 and se l le r s ' 
posi t ion will be se t t led at the Exchange delivery 
settlement price, which is an average of quotations 
for the HSI taken at five - minute intervals during 
the l a s t trading day rounded to the nearest whole 
number. Note, no physical stocks are transferred, 
only the difference between the price at which the 
contract i s struck and the delivery settlement price 
i s t ransfer red . This arrangement i s e f f ic ien t as i t 
can minimize the transaction cost for collecting 
numerous stocks for delivery. 
Different types of HSI contracts with different 
delivery months are traded on HKFE. Before February 
1989, three types of contracts were traded* i . e . spot 
month and the next two calendar months
7
. While 
s t a r t i ng from February 1989, the expiration cycle was 
changed to February, April, June, August, October and 
December. From January 1991, delivery months include 
spot month, the next calendar month, and the next two 
calendar quarter months. 
7
For instanace, if it is June, the delivery months cover June, July and August. 
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As 工 have mentioned at the s t a r t of th is 
section, the Crash led to a suspicion on the role 
played by HSI Futures markets. Investors lost 
confidence as can be ref lected by the inactive 
trading ac t i v i t i e s a f t e r the Crash. And then, 
subsequent reforms, suggested by the Securities 
Review Committee, were taken by the regulatory system 
of the Futures Exchange. The reform mainly focused on 
the improvement of r isk management of the Clearing 
House and the capital adequacy of the brokers to 
assume r i sk . Through the reform, i t can be observed 
that the more well-regulated Futures Market could 
cope with adverse trading condition, such as a single 
day drop of more than 580 index points (22% drop) 
following the massacres in Beijing. Furthermore, 
investors ' confidence seems to build up again as 
evidence from the increasing turnover of the HSI 




Table 2.1 Annual Turnover nf various futures contracts 
traded on HK Futures ExchangP from 1977 to 1988 (unit:1 
Million、 
Cotton Sugar Soy Bean Gold HSI 
(US$) (US$) (HK$) (US$) (HK$) 
1977 1 2 8 1 5 " . . 
1978 103 23 _ 
1979 13 1 241 -
1980 633 671 10046 1771 _ 
1 9 8 1
 639 2192 27247 1629 -
1982 - 4040 40681 431 -
1 9 8
3 - 4038 50838 268 -
1 9
84 - 1348 26206 220 -
1985 - 1270 19856 197 -
工 9 8 6 - 2 2 2 5 1 7 7 5 6 2 4 2 8 9 7 8 4 
(2 .0 ) (16 .1 ) (0 .2 ) (81 .6 ) 
1987 - 2448 38936 260 585078 
( 0 . 4 ) ( 6 . 2 ) ( 0 . 0 ) ( 9 3 . 4 ) 
19 88 (Jan - 679 9389 30 7208 
to May) (4.0) (54.3) (0.2) (41.7) 
Note: Values in the parentheses represent the percentage in the 
total turnover. 
Sources: Hong Kong Financial System 1993，pp.368 
Table 2.2: Average Monthly 






1987 了00944 — 
1988 ~1713 — 
1989 "19672 
1990 "19688 — 
1991 41819 
1992 "90752 — 
1993 "T01538 "1 
# average figure covering 




Chapter 3 . Dvnam-i c Efficienny 
During the 1987 Stock market Crash, the stock 
index futures was blamed for exacerbating the market 
decline in the US. Hong Kong, which experienced the 
second larges t decline in the crash, also accused the 
HSI futures market of causing the crash. Many 
suggested that the futures market should be simply 
closed down as i t could not serve i t s economic 
functions. In US, an interes t in the proper 
assessment and evaluation of the economic function of 
the stock index futures market had thus been 
rekindled. 
If index futures market is to serve i t s 
designated role as a means for hedging stock market 
r i sk and a vehicle for price discovery, then the 
underlying spot market and the derivative futures 
market should effec t ively function as one market. 
This arouses the in teres t of academicians to study 
the pr icing relationship between the stock index 
futures and the underlying stock markets. There are 
two quite d i s t inc t strands that have emerged in the 
extant l i t e r a t u r e : those studies that analyze 
mispricing by comparing the actual futures prices 
with i t s f a i r or theoret ical current value in order 
to determine whether prof i table arbitrage 
opportunit ies are available; and those that analyze 
the lead-lag relat ionship between the two markets-..… 
In fac t , the lead-lag rela t ion between stock 
index spot and futures markets has been of interest 
to academicians, regulators and pract i t ioners . Wahab 
and Lashgari (1993) outline three main reasons :1) 
The issue i s inextricably linked to the notions of 
market ef f ic iency and arbi trage. 2)The issue can 
provide insight into the important function of 
futures market - the price discovery. 3)The issue 
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pertains to potential vo la t i l i ty - sp i l lover effects of 
futures trading. 
In Hong Kong, few studies have attempted to 
examine the fundamental economic role of the Hang 
Seng Index futures. Yau, Schneeweis, and Yung (1990) 
examine the daily mispricing behavior of the HSI 
futures for the period of 1986-1988 and find that HSI 
futures experienced many incidents of positive 
mispricing before but few a f t e r the Crash of October 
1987. Choi et al (1992) examine the lead/lag relat ion 
by using the VAR technique, covering the period from 
6 May 1986 to 27 February 1989. They find out that 
index futures prices cause cash index price to change 
in the pre-cash period but a feedback system in the 
post-cash period. 
However, using the VAR framework ignores the 
fact that the lead/lag relationships are affected by 
the arbi t rage ac t iv i t i e s , which are related to the 
basis between the two markets. So the fai lure to 
account for th is factor may give faulty inference. In 
th i s research, 工 will focus on the causal 
re la t ionship between the two markets for the period 
1986-1993 within the context of cointegration and 
error-correct ion model which expl ic i t ly considers the 
e f fec t of the arbitrage link - the basis - on the 
re la t ionship . 
3.1 The Potential Lead/Lag Relationship between 
the Stock Index Futures Price and the Stock Index 
Potential ly, the d i f f e ren t i a l response of both 
markets give r ise to a lead-lag structure. 
There , are several factors that explain why 
futures prices may lead spot prices. 
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1) Nonsynchronous trading in the underlying 
stocks. Since component stocks may not trade in every 
ins tan t , so that observed prices may not re f lec t 
“true，，prices. However, an index futures contract 
represents a single claim on the por t fol io of 
component stocks, hence, do not suffer from the 
nonsynchronous trading problem observed for the spot 
index. 
2) Lower cost trading in futures market. If a 
t rader received a bul l ish information on the economy, 
he may e i the r buy HSI futures or the underlying 
stocks. However, the futures trade can be effect ive 
immediately and only a small amount of margin as 
deposits in the accounts should be placed, while 
actual stock purchases require a greater i n i t i a l 
investment and may take longer time to implement, as 
the trade involves numerous individual stock 
t ransact ions . This transaction preferences can 
explain why changes in futures prices may lead the 
spot pr ices . 
3) Market charac ter i s t ics . I t is well known that 
prohibi t ing traders from shorting slows the 
adjustment of prices to private information, 
especial ly with respect to private bad news. As there 
i s no shor t -sa le constraint in the futures market, 
the lead-lag relat ionship would not be the same under 
bearish and bul l i sh markets .and futures prices should 
lead the cash index to a greater degree under bad 
news - i f - t h e short-sale constraint i s binding. 
In addition, f r i c t i on such as time delays in 
updating and transmitting updated spot index values 
may also explain the tendency of stock index futures 
price returns to lead spot index pr ice , re turns • 
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On the other hand, changes in the spot index may 
induce changes in the futures market sentiment that 
would be ref lec ted in subsequent futures price 
changes, giving r i se to a tendency of the index 
futures to lag the spot index. 
Empirical Evidence of the Lead/Lag 
Relationship - the US experience 
Kawaller, Koch and Koch (1987) examine the 
intra-day lead/lag relationship between S&P 500 
futures and S&P 500 index in the sp i r i t of Granger's 
one-sided regression framework. The data covers a l l 
the trading days in 1984 and 1985. Their resul ts 
suggest that S&P 500 futures prices and the index are 
simultaneously related on a minute-to-minute basis 
throughout the trading days. On the other hand, 
futures prices consistently lead the index prices 
from twenty to forty - five minutes, while the lead 
from cash prices to futures prices, though 
s ign i f ican t , rarely exceeds one minutes. Also, the 
lead/ lag relat ionships are found to be stable across 
the period examined. 
Stol l and Whalley (1990) investigate the causal 
re la t ionship between stock index and index futures 
contracts. - the S&P 500’ and MM index futures, for the 
period 21 April 1982 through 31 March 1987 of S&P 500 
and 23 July 1982 through 31 March 1987 of MMI 
futures . 5-minutes returns series are used. As 
nonsynchroneity and bid-ask bounce effects make the 
return ser ies noisy, ARMA models are used to f i l t e r 
the return ser ies before going on the examination. 
Stock index return innovations are then used in a 
two-sided regression procedure, including lead, 
contemporaneous, and lagged returns ^on the nearby 
contracts . " On average, S&P 500 and MMI futures 
returns tend to lead the stock index return by about 
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10 minutes. However, there is s l ight evidence on the 
feedback from the stock to the futures markets. 
Kawaller, Koch and Koch (1993) examine the 
intra-day lead, lag relationship between S&P 500 
futures prices and the S&P 500 index by estimating 
dai ly Geweke measures of feedback for the period. of 
the fourth quarters of 1984, 1985 and 1986. The 
feedback measures indicate that the contemporaneous 
minute- to-minute price re la t ion between futures and 
the index dominates a l l lead-lag relat ions. Granger 
causal i ty also runs from futures to the index with 
greater frequency and to a greater extent than from 
the index to futures. 
3.3 Granger and Engle's Error Correction Model 
Granger and Engle (1987) introduce the concept 
of cointegration to tes t the causal relationship 
between two time ser ies . They allege that if two time 
ser ies are each non-stationary and their f i r s t 
difference are stationary, then a l inear combination 
of them is cointegrated if the combination obtains a 
s ta t ionary residual. The l inear combination 
represents a long-run equilibrium relat ion between 
the two time ser ies . In fact , i f a dynamic model only 
includes lagged changes of the variables, the model 
i s misspecified as i t ignores interim short - run 
adjustments to long-run equilibrium. On the other 
hand, a level specification i s simply a long-run 
re la t ionship and ignore the^ short-run adjustment 
between the two time ser ies . 
If two time series are cointegrated, then 
causal i ty must exist at least in one direction and 
possibly in both directions, which, represents a 
feedback system. Cointegration implies that each 
ser ies can be represented by a error-correction model 
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Which incorporate the l as t period equilibrium error 
as well as lagged values of the f i r s t -d i f f e rence of 
each se r i es as regressors. The causali ty can be 
examined by the s t a t i s t i c a l significance, and 
r e l a t i ve magnitude, of the coef f ic ien ts on the lagged 
regressors and the error-correct ion coef f ic ien t . 
Suppose the HSI futures prices and HSI prices 
are denoted by Ft and It. If both need to be di f fered 
once to achieve stat ionary, the ser ies are said to be 
of 1(1) se r i e s . The cointegration relat ionship 
between two 1(1) ser ies , Ft and I t can be tested by 
running the following OLS regression： 
Ft = a + pit + Z t 
The residual term Zt is then tested for whether i t i s 
a un i t - roo t process. If the uni t - root process is 
re jec ted , i t means that the two time series are 
cointegrated as they will not diverge in the long-run 
and p i s then called as the cointegration parameter. 
The following ADF regression i s employed to t es t for 
cointegration： 
n 
AZf = CT + (p - \)Zt_x + E r , AZM + et 
i=l 
Note, as the values of the cointegration vector 
(a,(3) are unknown, the t - r a t i o of the lagged variable 
term Zt-1 no longer have the Dickey-Fuller 
d i s t r i bu t ion , the c r i t i c a l values of the resultant 
d i s t r i bu t i on i s reported in Davidson and Mackinnon 
(1992). 
If the null-hypothesis of no cointegration i s 
re jec ted , ,ihen the error-correct ion? model can be 
formulated as below： 
22 
Zt = Ft - (a + pit) 
m n 
(1) A^=a 0 + + ^  at Mt_{ + + efi 
'•=i j=i 
m' n' 
(2) Mt = Zt_, + A^., Mt_. + 
i=l 7=1 
Where Zt represents the divergence from the 
equilibrium. 
eft, est are white noise process, possibly 
contemporaneously correlated, with a x + a \ ^0 
Eq(l) describes the dynamic of the return of 
futures price ser ies while Eq(2) represents that of 
HSI pr ices . Both equations assert that the changes in 
the dependent variables may be due to both "short-
run" e f fec t s , possibly from the lagged AFs and AIS, 
and to las t -per iod departure from equilibrium, which 
represents adjustment to long-run equilibrium. If the 
coeff ic ient of the error correction term is small, 
then the LHS variable has l i t t l e tendency to correct 
a disequilibrium. 
The number of lags of AIS and AFS in Eq(l) and 
(2) are determined by the procedure suggested by 
Hsiao (1979)
1
 • He proposes to choose the number of 
lags (m,n) to minimize some c r i t e r i a . The c r i t e r i a 
usually take the form of residual sum of square (ESS) 
multiplied by a penalty factor which depends on the 
number of lags chosen. In th is way, although more 
lags will reduce ESS, the penalty will also 
increased. The cr i te r ion being used here is Akaike 
in format ioncr i t e r ion (AIC) which is defined as： 
r • 
1 See Hsiao (1979). Judge, G.G.et al. (1985), pp.688-690. 
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AIC(n,m) = [ESS/T]exp(2K/T) 
where ESS = residual sum of squares of the 
regression. 
K = number of parameters estimated. 
T = numbers of observations 
After choosing the c r i t e r ion , the no. of lags in 
Eq(l) can be selected as follows： 
Step 1. Determine m such that 
AIC(m, _) = min{AIC(l, _) | l = 1,…，m} 
where the dash indicates that the second 
var iable i s not included, the optimal 
univar ia te AR model for AFt i s determined. 
Step 2. Choose n such that 
AIC(m, n) = min{AIC(m,l) 11 = 1 , . . . , n] 
Hence, the optimal lags of Alt i s selected 
Step 3. Select m so that 
AIC(in, n) = iriin{AIc:(l, n) \ l= 1, . . . m) 
Thus the lags of AFt and. Alt are chosen 
Hence, the proper lag order of AFS and AIS in Eq(2) 
i s determined s imilar ly , the equations then estimated 
j o i n t l y by i t e r a t i v e seemingly uncorrelated 
regression (ISUR)• Ordinary Least Square regression 
should not be employed as the error terms may be 
contemporaneously correlated as information shocks 
may move futures p r i c e s , and index prices 
simultaneously. In t h i s s tudies, a maximum lag length 
of 15 i s chosen. 
Following the estimation, causal i ty between the 
se r i e s can i>e tes ted . The t e s t i s in the sp i r i t of 
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Granger Causality^, if the causal i ty is run from 
futures to spot, i t requires that zero res t r i c t ions 
be imposed on the d is t r ibuted lag coeff ic ients aj. 
That means, the following two hypothesis are tested： 
HI : AFt does not lead Alt (ie. cl=c2=. . .=cm=0) 
H2 : Alt does not lead AFt (ie. ai=a2=…=an=0) 
3-4 Error Correction Model for the Hana Sena Index 
Futures Price and Hana Sena Index 
Fi r s t l y , the whole sample period i s divided into 
three sub-periods. Pre-Crash Period (86/05/06 -
87/10/16), Post-Crash Period (87/11/02 - 89/06/02) 
and Post June 4 Beijing Incident (89/06/06 -
93/12/31) • Dividing the periods have the advantages 
tha t 1) the disturbance during the extreme periods 
which can a f fec t the lead-lag relat ionship between 
the fu tures and index prices can be eliminated, 2) 
the e f f ic iency of the two markets in di f ferent 
periods can be shed l ight on. 
Secondly, the s tat ionary of the logarithms of 
HSI fu tures prices and HSI prices are then examined 
using the ADF t e s t . From Table 3.1, i t i s discovered 
tha t the level of futures prices and index prices in 
the three periods have uni t - roo ts . When the i r f i r s t 
d i f fe rence are employed to t e s t for uni t - root , the 
nul l hypothesis of uni t -root i s rejected in a l l the 
2
 Granger's (1969) one sided regression approach involves estimating the following 
univariate autoregressive model : 
m n 化化 a Q + ^  Mh +》j 礼j + e 
i=i ；=i 
AIt = ^ + ^  , 
"/=1 ；=i 
when futures to cause spot price, some bj must be non-zero while all Ci must be jointly zero. 
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sub-periods. Hence, we can conclude that futures and 
cash pr ices are 1(1) ser ies . In the next step, we can 
then t e s t for cointegration between the two time 
se r ies . The residual from the l inear combination is 
subjected to the ADF t e s t . In the Post-Crash and Post 
June 4 sub-periods, there are evidences of 
cointegration, ie . Ft and It have the i r long-run 
equilibrium relat ionship. However, for the Pre-Crash 
period, the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
cannot be rejected. In th is way, the futures market 
and cash market are linked by arbitrage ac t iv i t i e s in 
the former two periods except the Pre-Crash period. 
In fac t , the resul t is not surprising as during 
the pre-crash period, futures price frequently trade 
at a very high premium while allow the arbitrageurs 
to gain an annual return as high as 30% (Securities 
Review Report, pp.408). This suggests that the market 
i s over-speculated due to the over-optimism about the 
tai l l ish market and a lack of suff ic ient arbitrageurs 
to ensure e f f i c i en t pricing of the futures contracts. 
However, a f t e r the Crash, the pract i t ioners staying 
in the market are mainly ins t i tu t iona l investors, 
which carry out trading in both the cash and futures 
markets for hedging purpose. Moreover, they trace the 
markets and response to the r iskless p rof i t making 
opportunit ies instant ly . So, both markets are linked 
afterwards. 
In order to further the studies, the time series 
property ‘ of the return series should be examined 
f i r s t . The return series are taken as the f i r s t 
difference of the logarithm of the price ser ies . As 
Stol l and Whaley (1990) allege that , 
"the observed index port fol io 
- y 
returns are not accurate ref lect ions 
of "true" index returns because not 
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a l l stocks in the index trade in 
every interval of time and because 
index levels are based on 
transaction prices of individual 
stock, not true prices ." 
A s n〇ise in the prices series tends to reduce the 
degree of association between the two return series, 
the true but unobserved returns series should be 
estimated. Here, we use ARMA f i l t e r to remove noise 
induced by infrequent trading and bid/ask spread 
e f f e c t . The innovations are then proxies for the 
"true" cash and futures return ser ies . 
Table 3.2 reports the autocorrelation 
coef f ic ien t s of cash and futures returns series for 
the three sub-periods, as well as that of the 
innovations of the respective ser ies . 
I t i s revealed that only the lag one 
autocorrelat ion coeff icient for HSI is s ignif icant ly 
d i f f e ren t from zero at the 10% level of significance 
for the Pre-Crash period. An AR(1) model is f i t t ed 
into the HSI return ser ies . After th is f i t t i ng , the 
autocorrelat ion problem of the return series is 
s e t t l ed . 
For the Post-Crash period, the ser ial 
corre la t ion problems are very serious for both of the 
return se r ies . The futures return series at lag 2,3 
and 4 are a l l s ignif icant- Moreover, the Ljung-Box 
s t a t i s t i c s which is used to tes t the null hypothesis 
that a l l se r ia l correlation taken jo in t ly up to the 
12th lag are ins ignif icant ly di f ferent from zero is 
also rejected. The return series of HSI also 
encounter the same s i tuat ion. We use, ARMA(2,2) and 
A R M A ( 2 / 4 ) to f i l t e r the return series of futures 
prices and HSI prices respectively. 
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The condition for the period a f t e r June 4 
incident i s rel ieved. Only lag 1 and 7 for futures 
re turn se r i e s are s igni f icant and only lag 1 i s 
s i gn i f i c an t for HSI return se r i e s . ARMA(l,i) and 
‘ ARMA(2,2) are adopted for the return ser ies of 
fu tu res and cash pr ices . 
Table 3.3 reports the estimation resu l t s for 
lead- lag re la t ionship for the Pre-Crash periods。 
For the Pre-Crash period, the returns of futures 
pr ices and HSI prices are mainly contemporaneously 
cor re la ted . The lags of both of the ser ies do not 
have any explanatory power to the dynamic of the 
re tu rn ser ies
3
 . In th i s way, though the HSI futures 
and HSI pr ices are not linked by arbi t rage force, 
they move largely in unison and the two markets are 
e f f i c i e n t in the sense that lagged terms cannot help 
to improve the forecast ing power of the movements of 
the s e r i e s . Of course, futures pr ices cannot provide 
the role of pr ice discovery in t h i s case. 
Table 3.4 & 3.5 report the estimation resu l t s 
for cointegrat ion and error correction model for the 
Post-Crash and Post-Tiananmen periods. 
The cointegration parameters are nearest to 
uni ty in both periods and the r e su l t s are anticipated 
owing to the fact that the cointegration vector i s 
ac tua l ly the basis
4
 • Thus arbi t rage a c t i v i t i e s 
ensure the two markets act as one market and avoid 
the pr ices from d r i f t i ng apart without bound. 
3 oniy lagged variables are included, the adjusted R-Square of both equations are 
negative. * 
4
 The fair futures price F t x is given by: 
F*t T = S t e ( ^ ( ^ ) ， ’ 
Taking natural logs of the above equation 
f*. T = st + (r-d)(T-t) 
If tke futures market is efficient in pricing the stock index futures contracts, then 
^^  f 一 0 
thUf^ T = (r-d)(T-t)，which is the basis, also acts as the error-correction mechanism. 
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However, we cannot tes t for the unity coefficient as 
the non-stationary return series render the 
s t a t i s t i c a l tes t ing invalid. 
In the Post-Crash period, the error correction 
coeff ic ient in Eq(i) i s negative and is not 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y di f ferent from zero, while that of 
Eq(2) i s posit ive and s igni f icant . Hence, the 
adjustment of las t period's disequilibrium is mainly 
through the changes of index prices• When the 
observed futures price is above the long run 
equilibrium level , (Z t.1>0) , the index price will 
adjust upwards in the next period and the departure 
from the equilibrium would then be reduced
5
. However, 
the error correction coeff ic ient is rel iably 
d i f fe ren t from unity, which indicates that the 
correction i s not strong
6
 • In order to shed light on 
the causal i ty between the two ser ies , the s t a t i s t i c a l 
s ignif icance of the lagged coeff ic ients of index 
returns from Eq(1) and lagged coeff ic ients of futures 
returns from Eq (2) are examined. If the index price 
leads the futures price, then the lagged coefficients 
of index returns from Eq(1) should be different from 
zero. The resul ts here document that index price 
leads futures price as the coeff ic ient sums of lagged 
index returns is s t a t i s t i c a l l y di f ferent from zero, 
the F-Stat i s 16.243 which is highly s ignif icant . On 
the other hand, futures price does not lead cash 
price as the lagged coeff ic ient of futures return 
does not re l iab ly d i f f e r from zero. 
Therefore, the evidence supports a tendency of 
the spot market leading the futures market, not the 
reverse. This seems to be in contrast with the 
exist ing l i t e r a tu r e which many put evidences on that 
-. ^ 
5 There are two more possible paths for adjustment to the equilibrium. The first is both the 
index and futures prices increase with index adjusting upwards to a greater degree. The second 
is that both series decline with futures prices adjusting downwards more. 
6 ^  t o markets are npt frictionless, the equilibrium error will not be corrected instantly. 
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futures market has greater tendency to lead the spot 
market. 
In fac t , th is finding may be due to the 
charac te r i s t i cs of the local f inancial market. Stock 
market trading ac t iv i t i e s mainly concentrate on 
several constituent shares of the HSI, such as Hong 
Kong Telecom and Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp., 
which have prominent influence on the index. As 
secur i ty-speci f ic informed traders prefer to trade 
the shares, not the index futures contracts, 
individual stock trading then a f fec t s the whole index 
movement which will induce changes in the futures 
market sentiment and futures price adjustment follows 




For the period a f t e r the June 4 Incident, the 
sign of the error correction coeff icients in both 
equations are consistent with the adjustment to long 
run equilibrium, since when futures prices are above 
i t s equilibrium level, they will adjust downwards 
while index prices move upwards. Hence, the deviation 
from equilibrium would become smaller and smaller 
overtime. Meanwhile, information flows between the 
two markets as feedback exis ts between the two 
ser ies , s t i l l , cash market leading the futures market 




 The above argument is also supported by the SRC report, pp. 158，which claims that the 
index components have occasionally been subject to manipulation and hence a play on an 
individual stock could affect the whole index and filter through to futures trading. 
8 above causality tests are duplicated by using Full-information maximum likelihood 
technique. The results are not altered by using this method. 
9 one should note that the futures market closed at 3:45pm starting from 1992, so the Post-
June 4 period may bring along the non-synchronous data problem which may lead to invalid 
causality relation in this period. However, since the spot market closes 15 minutes earlier than 
the futures market, information flows after the spot market closes will render the futures 
market adjusts first； following by the spot market in the next day. ^ hile we find out here a 
causal relation from spot to futures, which manifests that the leading from spot to futures 
should be more pronounced when using the synchronous data. Hence, our conclusion here 





 Simultaneous F.r-r0 r-corr^ri-ion Model 
At th i s point, one may be aware of that the very 
low R-square values indicate that lagged returns 
variables do not have sat isfactory explanatory power 
to the movements of the ser ies . This induces us to 
investigate the contemporaneous relat ion. 
In fact , if futures and cash markets act as one 
market, they will be contemporaneously correlated. 
Thus, contemporaneous values of the endogenous 
variables are also included into Eq(l) and (2) . AIt is 
included in Eq(l) and AFt is included in Eq(2) . The 
lag length is determined by the Hsiao procedure and 
the two equations should be estimated using 3 Stage 
Least Square as the simultajieity in the estimation 
makes OLS estimates biased and inconsistent. However, 
following the above procedure to estimate the lag 
length will cause the problem of under-identification 
of the system. In view of this , the lagged 
coeff ic ients of AIs in Eq(1) and lagged coefficient of 
AFS in Eq (2) are res t r ic ted to zero. The error 
correction model only allow lagged dependent 
variables, error correction terms and contemporaneous 
return of the other ser ies . Hence, the under-
ident i f ica t ion problem has been solved, the system 
can be estimated by 3SLS and the strength of the 
instantaneous causality can be investigated* This 
strategy i s also used by Wahab and Lashgari .(1993) • 
Table 3.4 & 3.5 report the result of 
simultaneous error correction estimation. 
I t can be observed that when contemporaneous 
variables are included in the system, R-square 
increases sharply. For example, i t raises from 0.012 8 
to 0.8602 "of the futures return error correction 
model in the Post-Crash period. So the result 
31 
strongly suggests that the futures and cash prices 
a r e
 contemporaneously correlated. Moreover, a l l the 
e r r
°
r C o r r e c t i o n
 coeff ic ients are significant and 
h a v e t h e
 expected signs. That means the equilibrium 
error will be corrected by the adjustment of both 
se r ies . The conclusions are similar to the Post-June 
4 Incident period. 
As a conclusion, the futures market and cash 
market are largely move in unison and effect ively 
function as one market a f t e r the Black Monday. The 
resu l t s here do not support the price discovery role 
played by futures price. On the contrary, there is 
evidence that the index price leads the futures price 
in the Post-Crash period whereas feedback occurs in 
the Pre-crash and Post June 4 incident period. 
Meanwhile, our resul ts are consistent with the 
e f f i c i en t market hypothesis as information seems to 
be ins tan t ly ref lected in both prices with the lagged 
returns variables having very poor explanatory power 
to the current return ser ies . Impressively, HSI 
futures market demonstrates improving pricing 
eff ic iency a f t e r the Crash. This may be due to the 
reform of the markets and the more maturity of 




Table 3.1 Summary f o r C!r»imfearatioii TAsf 
Unit-Root Test (Dicky-Fuller Test) 
Pre-Crash Per iod (86/05/06-87/10/16) ~ 
T e s t - S t a t i s t i c s 10% C r i t i c a l Value 
F u t u r e s
 0.1404 ^2TsT 
HSI 0.1935 -2.57 
AFutures -4.9712 -2.57 
AHSI -4.8652 -2.57 
Residual -1.9348 - 3 . 0 4 
Post-Crash Per iod (87/11/02-89/06/02) 
T e s t - S t a t i s t i c s 10% C r i t i c a l Value 
Futures -2.2298 ~ -2.57 
H S I
 -2.2398 -2.57 
AFutures -4.7860 -2.57 
AHSI -4.4873 -2.57 
Residual -4 .9058 - 3 .04 
Af t e r June 4 Tiananmen Incident (89/06/06-93/12/31) 
T e s t - S t a t i s t i c s 10% C r i t i c a l Value 
Futures 0.87946 -2.57 
HSI 1.5893 -2.57 
AFutures -5.8464 -2.57 
AHSI -5.8816 -2.57 
Residual -4 .5149 -3 . 04 
r » 
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Coeff ic ient .s-^Rturr ,如― a n d r 化⑶们卜“”。 
Pre-Crash Period (86/05/06-87/10/16) 
—T—— F u t u r e s Ret. HS工 R E T . AI ( A R ~ 
2 o-io* “ OF" 
t -0.02 -0.02 _0 03 
4 0-00 0.02 0：01 
t 0.06 0.05 0.06 
6 : 0 1 -0.05 -0.04 
° -0.08 -0.09 -0 09 
I -0.01 0.05 0 : 0 7 
q 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 
^ - ° '
0 7
 -0.07 -0.07 
” -0-02 0.00 0.01 
-0-04 -0.01 -0.01 
V 0.02 0.04 0.04 
Ljung-Box Pierce S ta t . ~~ 
二 丨 （ 8 . 2 3 ) 丨 （ 1 2 . 6 3 ) I (9.73) 
Post-Crash Period (87/11/02-89/06/02) • 
A F
 I 厶I I AF(AR=2;MA=2) AI (AR=2 ;MA=4) 
1
 0.00 0.02 0^ 01 Oo" 
2 -0.20* -0.15* 0.04 0.00 
3
 0.13* 0.10* 0.05 -0.01 
4
 0.14 0.15* 0.06 -0.03 
5
 -0.08 -0.08 -0.01 0.00 
6 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 
7 0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 
8 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.04 
9 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.08 
10 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
11 -0.09 0.11* -0.09 -0.10 
12 0.00 0.00 0.01 Q .00 
Ljung-Box Pierce S ta t . 
1 (39.22)* I (31.46)* | (9.17) [ (8.07) 
After June 4 Tiananmen Incident (89/06/06-93/12/31) 
AF I AI I AF(AR=1,.MA=1) AI (AR=2 ;MA=2) 
1 0.06* 0.06* 0.00 0.01 
2 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 
3 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 
4 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 
5 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.01 
6 -0。04 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 
7 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 
8 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 
9 0.07* 0.04 0.06 0.01 
10 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.00 
1 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 0 , 0 . 0 1 
12 0 . 02 丨 0.00 0.02 I 0 .00 
Ljung-Box Pierce Sta t . 
• 1 (15.86) I (14.68) 1 z (11.35) | (1.62) 
Note:Ljung Box statistic testing the null hypothesis that all serial correlations taken jointly up to 
the 12th lags are insignificantly different from zero. 
* Represent 5% level of significance 
： 一 
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Table 3.3 Nummary fn^ the 
r e l a t i on sh ip in tho p r e -C r a R h Po-t^h 
Pre-Crash Period (86/05/06-87/10/16) 
Lead-lag Relationship 
No. of 0bservations=3 60 
~ D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b f ^ 
A F
t A l t " 
Al t 1.0761 77" 
(54.1)*** 
AFt -- 0.9163 
(54.7)*** 
Constant 0.0020 -0.0018 
(6.647)*** (-6.553)*** 
J 0.7780 Q .7781 
*** denotes 1 % level of s igni f icance . 
磯 • y 
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^-
4 幻】mmarv of Mno Cointecr^ti o n and Error 
Correction Model in PnC t_C r a s h Lr-f^ 
Post-Crash Period (87/11/02-89/06/02) 






3 6 5 6 6
 + 1.0469If: R
2
=0.9952; DW=0.7386 
Dependent V a r i a b l e s 
Error Correction Model Simultaneous Error 
• — — , Correction Model 
A F
t AI t AFt I AlT" 
z
t _ l -0.082744 0.25955 -0.40635 0.3497 
(0.600) (2.101)* (-5.43)** (9.042)** 
F t
 — -- 0.79706 
(10.62)** 
A F
t - l 0.10217 0.15991 -0.042697 --
(0.6208) (1.255) (1.68) 
AF
t-2 0.31941 -- 0.09357 __ 
(4.739)** (3.665)** 
A F
t - 3 -0.14072 -- 0.059988 --
(-2.509)** (2.541)** 
AFt-4 -0.21166 0.10439 
(-3.606)** (4.371)** 
AFt-5 0.08485 -- -0.024665 --
(1.445) (-1.033) 
AFt-6 -0.00568 -- -0.002997 
(-0.1392) (0.1202) 
AFt-7 -0.10077 -- -0.04113 
(-2.623)** (-1.338) 
AFt-8 0.054899 -- 0.004553 
(1.422) (0.177) 
AFt-9 0.1147 -- 0.035852 --
(2.974)** (X.292) 
Alt - - -- 0.94769 
(8.406)** 
Alt- l @ -0.090527 -0.20686 -- -0.055292 
(-0.4961) (-1.460) (-2.991)** 
厶It-2 - 0 . 3 0 2 1 1 - 0 . 0 3 5 5 8 - - - 0 . 0 7 1 4 5 7 
(-3.192)** (-0.681) (-3.864)** 
Alt-3 0.21812 -0.07649 -- -0.068007 
(2.489)** (-0.461) (-3.671)** 
AIt-4 0.304 -0.05802 -- -0.11908 
— ( 3 . 3 3 3 ) * * (-1.119) (-6.139) ** 
AIt-5 -0.19251 -0.03954 -- 0.02543 
…… (-2.028)* (-0.748) (1.323) 
Alt-6 - - -0.019 -- -0.033027 
“"* (-0.461) (-1.798) 
AI t_ 7 -- -0.10515 -- 0.025838 
(-2.743)** (1.343) 
A l t _ 8 - - 0 . 046137 - - - 0 . 0 0 8 5 7 3 
(1.192) (-0.4393) 









( - 0 . 0 5 0 2 ) ( 0 . 0 5 7 2 ) ( - 0 , 1 3 2 9 ) ( 0 . 2 3 5 4 ) 
Q.0118 0.0333 0.8602 0*8826 
@ F -Stat for the null hypothesis that the sum of the five lagged index return coefficients is 
zero = 16.243 * 
* and ** denote 5% and 10% level of significance respectively 
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n f t h e
 CoiTit-pgration 抓H 
Correct ion Model ^ P〜t-Tian抓TtUn ^ T ^ 
(89/06/06-93/12/31) 
Cointegra t ion ： “ — — 
—
F t =
 -0.0088.712 + 1 . Q Q 1 T . ； R 2 = 0 .9994; DW=0.4167 
Dependent-. Variableg 
Error Correction Model Simultaneous e r ro r 丨 
correc t ion Model 
^ t Alt AFt I 
z t
_ l -0.075019 0.042245 -0.22351 0.2324 
(-1.S56) (1.033) (-6.383)** (10.38)** 
t — ” 1.0317 
A„ n (8.73)** 
A
F t - l -0.004472 0.3966 -0.023249 
(-0.0645) (6.474)** (-0.9055) 
A
Ft-2 0.22575 0.031568 --
( - 6 . 5 9 2 ) * * (1 .422) 
AF t-3 -0.19015 __ 0.015857 --
(-5.57)** (0.7381) 
AFt-4 -0.11594 __ -0.000318 --
(-3.45)** (-0.0160) 
AFt-5 0.0789 -0.003404 
(2.417)** (-0.1736) 
AFt-6 -0.1221 -- -0.003445 --
(-3.995)** (0.1749) 
AFt-7 -0.036475 -- --
(-2.875)** 
Alt： -- — 0.97995 
(7.266)** 
A l t - l @ 0.008561 -0.37149 -- 0.020155 
(0.116) (-5.691)** (1.462) 
Alt-2 0.26337 -- -- -0.041857 
(7.252)** (-2.902)** 
Alt-3 0.2158 -- -- -0.015804 
(5.908)** (-1.133) 
Alt-4 0.11063 __ --
—— (3.055)** 
Alt-5 0.05317 -- --
‘ (1.527)* 




 -0.59x10 0.51x10 
(-0.0442) (0.01643) (-0 .1329) (0.2354) 
R
2
 0.0215 0.0439 0.8150 0.7675~ 
@ F - Stat for the null hypothesis that the sum of the six lagged index return coefficient is 
zero = 23.993 * 
* and ** denote 5% and 10% level of significance respectively 
• * 
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Chapter d Price Vnl … i 〜 
The debate on whether commodities futures 
markets des tabi l ize the underlying spot markets has a 
very long history. Whereas, the October Crash 
res t a r t ed the debate on whether financial index 
futures increases the vo l a t i l i t y of the stock 
markets. One may wonder why vo l a t i l i t y matters and 
the ra t ionales of futures market destabi l ize the spot 
market. 
4.1 Whv Volatility Matters： 
Although some vo l a t i l i t y in the prices of 
f inancia l assets i s comprehensive as i t is a normal 
part of the process of al locat ing investable funds 
among competing uses. However, excessive or extreme 
v o l a t i l i t y of the asset prices may be detrimental. 
Edwards (1988) suggests that stock price vo l a t i l i t y 
may hinder economic performance in the following 
ways : 
F i r s t l y , a sizable f a l l in stock price would 
reduce consumer wealth which is expected to lower 
consumer expenditure d i rec t ly . In addition, a 
weakening in consumer confidence would contribute to 
a fur ther spending reduction. 
Secondly, stock price vo l a t i l i t y may also affect 
business investment spending. Investors may perceive 
a r i se in stock market vo l a t i l i t y as an increase in 
the r i sk of equity investments. This reaction would 
tend to ra ise the cost of funds to firms issuing 
stock. 
To sum： up, when asset prices exhibit very high 
v o l a t i l i t y in a very short time period' investors may 
wonder whether the f inancial markets are subject to 
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excess-speculation. They may lose confidence on the 
bel ief that f luctuation in prices re f lec t s changes in 
economic fundamential. Thus, great vo l a t i l i t y may 
bring along with i t a general loss of market 
l iqu id i ty , leading to an increase in cost for fund 
ra is ing. 
Then why should the introduction of futures 
trading increases the vo l a t i l i t y of cash market? Many 
of the proposals put forth by the post-crash studies 
concerning trading in stock index futures, which, 
because of the i r low transaction costs and low margin 
requirements, are viewed as f ac i l i t a t i ng speculative 
ac t i v i t y . The most widespread argument is that 
futures markets are inherently more vola t i le than 
cash markets, presumably because futures market 
par t ic ipants are more highly leveraged and 
speculatively oriented than cash market investors. 
Such v o l a t i l i t y may then sp i l l over from futures 
markets to cash markets by r isk arbitrageurs and 
por t fo l io insuirers. 
4.2a Theoretical Foundation of the relationship 
between Futures Trading and Cash Market Volatility 
The theoret ical studies on the effects of 
futures trading on the cash market show that the 
e f fec t s are ambiguous. For example, Stein (1987) 
shows that f inancial futures trading reduces the cost 
of entry of small traders into the financial market. 
Although 'introducing new speculators into the markets 
improves r i sk sharing and increases l iquidi ty , i t can 
equally make cash prices more noisy and reduce social 
welfare i f these new speculators are less informed 
than t raders already in the market. On the other 
hand, some.- suggest that if trading volumes are 
diverted from the underlying stocks to index futures ' 
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the decreased l iquidi ty in the underlying stocks 
nught increase the i r price vo l a t i l i t y . 
The opposing views are held by Friedman. He 
suggests that speculation can s tabi l ize prices 
because well-informed speculators tend to buy when 
prices are low. So thei r action will push up the 
pr ices . When prices are high, they will se l l and push 
down pr ices . Hence, thei r trading will make the 
prices rather stable. To the less-informed 
speculators, they will be eliminated from the markets 
by the i r ignorance. Danthine (1978) suggests that 
futures markets reduce the cost to informed traders 
of responding to mispricing, so market depth is 
improved and vo l a t i l i t y is reduced. 
Hence, theoretical analysis of whether 
speculative trading in futures markets destabil izes 
cash markets leads to conflicting conclusions, 
depending on which assumptions are made. 
4. 2b Empirical Evidence of Futures Trading and 
Cash Market Volatility 一 the US Experience 
Empiricallv, Stoll and Whaley (1987) have 
studied the vo l a t i l i t y surrounding expiration days, 
including the t r i p l e witching days
1
 and find that the 
S&P 500 index vo l a t i l i t y increases on expiration 
days, but the increase is in a very short time 
period, mainly in the las t 15 minutes of trading on 
those days. Edwards (1988), using variance ra t io 
t e s t s of daily returns from June 1973 to May 1987, 
concludes that the introduction of financial futures 
trading in in teres t rates and stock indexes has not 
destabi l ized the underlying cash markets. Harris 
(1988) uses, a cross-sectional analysis of covariance 
1 ^ date when options on individual stocks and market indices, futures on market indices, 
and options on market index futures expire simultaneously. 
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regression model to determine whether S&P 500 stock 
p r i c e
 v o l a t i l i t y have changed rela t ive to that of 
non-S&P 500 stocks, when the index futures are 
introduced. The study period spans from 1975 to 1987. 
He finds that individual stock returns in the S&P 500 
are more vo la t i l e in the post-futures preiod than the 
non-S&P 500 stock returns, a f t e r adjusting the 
e f fec t s of the cross-sectional differences in beta, 
price leve l ' market value, and trading frequency of 
individual stock. Kamara, Miller and Siegel (1992) 
examine the ef fec t of futures trading on the stock 
v o l a t i l i t y by controlling the rate of productivity 
ac t iv i ty , default r isk, term structure, unanticipated 
in f l a t ion , and then using Goldfeld-Quandt tes t to 
invest igate whether the conditional variance for the 
pre-(1976-1982) and post-(1982-1988) futures eras are 
equal. He finds that the conditional vo l a t i l i t y of 
monthly S&P 500 index is s l igh t ly lower in the post-
futures era. Bessembinder and Seguin (1992) examine 
whether greater futures- trading ac t iv i t i e s (volume 
and open interest ) is associated with greater equity 
v o l a t i l i t y from the period 1978 to 1989. He regresses 
daily S&P 500 vo la t i l i t y , estimated by Schwert (1990) 
i t e r a t i on method, on NYSE composite volume, S&P 500 
futures volume, and daily open in teres t . He finds 
that active futures trading enhances the l iquidi ty 
and depth of the equity market. 
For the local studies on th is matter, Andrew 
F.Freris (1991) has examined the s t ab i l i t y of the 
dai ly percentage change of the HSI and the intra-
spread before and a f te r the introduction of the HSI 
futures contracts by using correlogms and the Box-
Pierce Q tes t for white noise. He finds that there 
was no s t a t i s t i c a l l y s ignif icant increase in the 
inter-day vp l a t i l i t y of the HSI market a f t e r the 
launch of the HSI futures contract, although intra-
day v o l a t i l i t y may have increased. But, his resul ts 
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are not pervasive in the following two ways. F i rs t , 
he inappropriately use t and F tes t s for 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y comparisons given the absence of 
s t a t i ona r i t y and normality in the dis t r ibut ion of the 
return se r ies . Moreover, the s t ab i l i t y of HSI a f t e r 
futures trading may be due to other factors, not 
necessary the e f fec t of HSI futures trading. So, i t 
i s worth to examine the issue in the other way. 
4.3 The Schwert Estimation Method 
The previous studies on the effect of futures 
trading on stock market vo l a t i l i t y mainly focus on 
the comparison of market behavior before and a f t e r 
the introduction of futures trading. Such comparisons 
are analogous to event studies conducted with a 
sample of one, and assume that the other factors 
which may a f fec t cash price vo l a t i l i t y and l iquid i ty 
are keep constant. In th i s study,工 t ry to supplement 
with more speci f ic t es t based on HSI futures trading 
a c t i v i t i e s and investigate whether the vo l a t i l i t y i s 
re la ted to the contract l i f e cycle. 
In order to find out the relationship between 
stock index vo l a t i l i t y and futures trading, index 
v o l a t i l i t y should be modelled f i r s t . There are 
several s ty l i sh facts about the stock index 
v o l a t i l i t y . One is the persistence of vo l a t i l i t y 
shocks. An increase in current vo l a t i l i t y will tend 
to l a s t for a cer tain period (French, Schwert and 
Stambaugh- (1987) ) . The o the r^ i s the leverge effect 
(Christie (1982)) where stock vo l a t i l i t y increases 
a f t e r stock price f a l l s . To account for these 
charac te r i s t i c s , Schwert (1990) modifies the strategy 
followed by French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1987). The 
method allQws for unbiased estimation of daily 
standard deviation and i t requires i te ra t ion among 
three equations. 
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n 4 n A 
R ' = 5 + PA +L7tj Gt-j+Ut ( i ) 
7=1 /=1 户 1 
A 
5 = | 。 卜 V^TI (2) 
,4 n 
O", =at+2Jfi.U(_j +Z1A +Xpjat-j+£t (3) 
j=l 1=1 j=l 
where Rt = 100*ln(P t/P t_工）is the return of HSI 
on day t 
Ut i s residual from (1) 
A 
Ot i s the standard deviation of the 
estimated conditional return on day t 
di are the dummy variables represent days of 
the week 
Fi t ted values from (1) estimate conditional , 
expected returns. The daily dummies are used to 
capture d i f fe r ing mean daily return. The residuals., 
from Eq(1) estimate unexpected return and when taking 
absolute sign and multiplying by (7C/2)
1/2, they 
represent the standard deviation of the stock return 
• A 
in period t . Schwert and Seguin (1990) show that CTt 
i s , as siiming conditional normality, an unbiased 
estimate of the standard deviation of daily return. 
Conditional standard deviations are estimated by-
regressing those standard deviations estimates on 
dai ly duinmies
3
, lagged standard deviation estimates 
3 The fact that four individual stock exchange are unified to Stock Exchange of Hong Kong 
Ltd. on April 2 1986, and afternoon trading section on Wednesday only exist after July 8 
1986 represent structural changes which may affect stock returns, volatility and trading 
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and lagged raw residuals (unexpected returns) . Lagged 
standard deviation estimates are included to 
accommodate the persistence of vo l a t i l i t y shocks. 
Lagged raw residuals from (1) are included to allow 
for the leverage ef fec ts in the return - vo l a t i l i t y 
re la t ion . If the dis t r ibut ion of the return shocks 
exhibits negative skewness, the unexpected and the 
absolute unexpected return will be negatively 
correlated. Therefore, negative coeff icients on 
unexpected returns put evidence on the asymmetrical 
re la t ion between stock return and vo l a t i l i t y . As 
usual, dai ly dummies are added to allow for day-of-
week differences in mean vo l a t i l i t i e s . 
Equation (1) and (3) are estimated sequentially, 
as recommended by Davidian and Carroll (1987)
4
. Firs t , 
Equation (1) is estimated without lagged vo la t i l i t y 
estimates • The transf orma_tiori in Equation (2〉 is 
applied to the residuals and Equation (3) is 
estimated. Fit ted values from Equation (3) are then 
included as regressors in reestimating (1) , for the 
fact that returns at time t depend on risk 
assessments and the vo l a t i l i t y estimate is a measure 
of r i sk . 
In order to evaluate re la t ion between trading 
ac t i v i t y and vo la t i l i t y , several ac t iv i ty variables 
are added into Equation (3) and the estimating 
equation becomes: 
Ot =«+£ ^ijUt_j +^ZriA +L Pj (y t-j+^,(l>kAk +et (4) 
j=l i=l j=l k=l 
volume, dummy variables equal to one are added to the equations after April 2 1986 and July 
8 1986 respectively^  Moreover, slopes are also allowed to change in these days. The results 
are not reported as'the dummies are not significant with other coefficients unaltered. 
4 Resuits reported are based on OLS estimation. An weighted least square procedure 
suggested by Davidian and Carroll (1987)，with predicted values from (3) used as weights for 
estimation (1)，are also computed. But, conclusions are unaffected by this estimation. 
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where Ak are the trading ac t iv i ty variables. 
Hence, i te ra t ion is between Eq (1) and Eq (4) • 
Moreover, since the presence of 
heteroskedast ici ty in the model will give faulty 
inferences, the tes t s t a t i s t i c s for variable 
coef f ic ien ts are estimated by White (1980) 
heteroskedastici ty - consistent covariance matrix 
estimator, which allows for proper inferences to be 
drawn without prior knowledge on the specific model 
of the heteroskedasticity. 
Trading Ac t i v i t i e s Variables 
Spot trading volume, futures trading volume and 
open in te res t are used to assess the relationship 
between trading ac t iv i t i e s and vo l a t i l i t y . 
The stock volume variable is usually measured by 
number of shares traded divided by the number of 
shares outstanding. However, in Hong Kong, turnover 
i s measured in dol lars . Hence, in order to adjust for 
the var ia t ion in the turnover volume due primarily to 
a var ia t ion in stock prices, we follow the practice 
of Ho e t . a l . (1993) . The trading volume, Vt, at time t 
i s defined as： 
Vt = Tot / Pt 
where Tot 土s the value of the turnover volume in HK 
dol lars at time t and Pt i s the closing HSI at time 
t . 
As the main aim is to investigate the effect of 
futures trading ac t iv i t i e s on HSI vo la t i l i t y , trading 
volume and open interes t of HSI futures contracts are 
employed. Open in teres t i s included 'because i t is 
supposed that open interes t may be correlated with 
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the number of active informed t raders . Bessembinder 
and Seguin (1993) suggests： 
” open in teres t as of the close 
of trading l ike ly r e f l ec t s 
primarily hedging ac t iv i ty and, 
thus, proxies for the amount of 
uninformed trading. Using open 
in te res t in conjunction with 
volume data may provide insights 
into the price e f fec t s of market 
ac t iv i ty generated by informed 
versus uninformed traders.，， 
In order to mitigate any e f fec t s of secular 
volume growth, the original ser ies are detrended by 
i t s 100-day moving average to obtain a detrended 
a c t i v i t y se r ies . Moreover, since trading volumes are 
highly s e r i a l l y correlated, i t implies that volume is 
highly forecastable. Therefore, the detrended series 
are par t i t ioned into expected and unexpected 
components to see whether there are asymmetrical 
e f f ec t on the vo l a t i l i t y . ARMA(12,1) is used to 
p a r t i t i on the ser ies . In th i s way, the expected 
component of the detrended ser ies will re f lec t 
a c t i v i t y that i s forecastable but highly variable 
across days. The 100-day moving average series are 
used, to capture the slower adjusting changes in 
forecastable ac t iv i ty . 
The 一 t ime ser ies mean from each ac t iv i ty series 
are deducted. The intercept in (4) can then be 
in terpre ted as the unconditioned return standard 
deviat ion. Moreover, each ac t iv i ty ser ies i s scaled, 
so that the unit of analysis i s 10000 adjusted spot 
trading volume and 1000 contracts of 一 futures trading 
• * 
volume and open in t e re s t . 
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Table 4.2 reports the ser ia l correlation 
coef f ic ien t s of the ac t iv i t i e s series and the 
innovations ser ies . 
Table 4.3 l i s t s out descriptive s t a t i s t i c s on 
corre la t ion coeff ic ients of these data ser ies . First , 
corre la t ion between 100-day moving average of spot 
and futures volume and open interest are positive and 
of similar magnitude. Expected spot trading volume 
are pos i t ive ly correlated with expected trading 
volume, though in a smaller magnitude. The 
corre la t ion between moving average of futures trading 
a n d
 open in te res t is very s ignif icant , as expected, 
for they both represent trading of the same type of 
instrument. Unexpected spot and futures trading 
ac t iv i ty are negatively correlated and the 
corre la t ion i s negligible. Hence the hypothesis that 
information shocks generate trading in both markets 
does not gain the support in th is simple examination. 
4.4 HSI Volatility and Cash Market Trading Volume 
Equation (4) is estimated with spot market -
trading volume as the only ac t iv i ty variable f i r s t . 
These resu l t s are presented in Table 4.4. Estimated 
coef f ic ien ts on each of the three components of spot-
trading volumes are positive with the moving average 
and the unexpected s ignif icant , indicating that 




Moreover, the estimated coefficient on 
unexpected trading volume is approximately four times 
and nine times as large as the estimated coefficient 
on moving average volume and expected trading volume 
respect ively. This means that surprises in spot-
5 The result is reasonable as information shocks can affect both the variance of price changes 
and trading volume. Karoff (1987) presents a detail survey on the relationship between trading 
volume and volatility. 
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trading volume are much more important for explaining 
spot v o l a t i l i t y then ei ther short-term or long-term 
var ia t ions in the anticipated level of trading 
ac t i v i t y . in addition, the resul ts manifest 
s ign i f ican t day-of-the-week effect and persistence of 
v o l a t i l i t y . The coefficient of unexpected sum is -
0.3882, which supports the existence of leverage 
e f f ec t . Hence, the findings j u s t i f y the use of this 
speci f ic model. 
4.5 HSI Volatility and Futures Trading Activity 
The futures trading volume and open interest are 
then included in Equation (4) • Similar to the spot 
trading volume, the futures trading volume and open 
in te res t are decomposed into three additive 
components. Results are summarized in Table 4.5. 
At a f i r s t glance, inclusion of futures trading 
a c t i v i t i e s do not a l t e r the sign of the components of 
spot trading ac t iv i t i e s , while the magnitude of 
expected spot trading volume is substantial ly larger 
than when no future trading exis ts . The coefficient 
estimate for unexpected futures trading volume is 
posi t ive , jus t l ike that of unexpected spot trading 
volume. This is anticipated as information shocks 
shake prices and generate trading in both spot and 
futures markets. However, unexpected open interest 
s.eems to decrease vo l a t i l i t y . Consequently, an 
increase in open interes t during the trading days 
lessens the impact of a volume shock on vo la t i l i t y . 
Moreover, contrary to expected spot trading 
volume, expected futures trading volume and expected 
futures open interes t are negative, implying that 
these components of ac t iv i ty lead to decrease spot 
price vo l a t i l i t y , rather than increase i t . In 
addition, moving average of futures trading volume is 
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also negative, implying long-term trading in futures 
market also decrease spot market vo l a t i l i t y . However, 
a l l the components of futures trading volume and open 
in te res t are s t a t i s t i c a l l y insignif icant . This 
implies that futures trading ac t iv i t i e s can not 
explain the vo l a t i l i t y of spot price. 
A t
 th i s point, one may wonder the existence of 
mul t icol l inear i ty problem for the correlation between 
the moving average of the spot and futures volume is 
0.44, while between the spot and open interest is 
0 . 5 2 . In th i s way, the estimates of the futures 
trading volume and open interes t appear not 
s t a t i s t i c a l significance may simply be due to the 
mul t icol l inear i ty which makes the sample unable to 
i so la te the effect precisely. Moreover, although 
mul t icol l inear i ty imparts no bias, the coefficient 
estimates are only of pa r t i a l e f fec ts , given the 
level of other variables. Thus, the expected and 
moving average of futures trading volume reduce the 
spot market vo l a t i l i t y , only conditional on the level 
of spot market ac t iv i ty . Since i t is d i f f i cu l t to 
measure how the spot trading a l t e r s without futures 
trading, we can only estimate the par t i a l effect of 
futures trading on index vo l a t i l i t y , rather than the 
to t a l e f f ec t . 
To sum up, the spot price vo l a t i l i t y is 
pos i t ive ly related .to spot-trading ac t iv i t i e s , no 
matter i t i s expected or unexpected. Moreover, the 
futures market ac t iv i t i e s do not seem to be relevant 
for the explanation of spot price vo l a t i l i t y . Even if 
i t had e f fec t s , the par t i a l e f fec ts of expected and 
moving average of futures trading volume, expected 
and unexpected open interes t only alleviated spot 





6 H S I
 Volatility and Contract L i f e C v r l ^ 
Even though futures trading is irrelevant of the 
cash market vo l a t i l i t y , one may s t i l l wonder whether 
spot price vo l a t i l i t y will vary with the contract 
l i f e cycle. Stoll and Whaley (1987) have put evidence 
that spot price vo l a t i l i t y increases at the futures 
expiration day. In this section, the relat ion between 
spot price vo l a t i l i t y and contract l i f e cycle will be 
investigated. 
工 wil l construct a variable DTE - the number of 
trading days unt i l the nearest HSI futures contract 
expires - to measure the re la t ion. Equation (4) will 
be estimated with DTE as the only explanatory 
variable and resul ts are reported in Table 4.6. The 
DTE coeff ic ient is negative, implying that spot price 
v o l a t i l i t y increases as the futures contract come to 
expirat ion. However, owing to the low value of R-
Square and s t a t i s t i c a l l y insignif icant of DTE 
coef f ic ien t , the spot price vo l a t i l i t y does not seem 
to be related to contract l i f e cycle. 
The resul ts here suggest that there is no 
evidence of HSI futures market trading destabilizes 
the spot market. As Grossman (1988) has suggested... 
that index: arbitrage improves market depth. So, any 
suggestions that trading constraints be imposed on 
the futures trading may not be worthwhile as this 
would be weaken the link between the two markets. 
t» 
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TABLE 4.1, SUMMARY STATTSTTPS 
Autocorrelation at lag 
VARIABLE Mean St.Deviation 1 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 




HSI Futures 4671.96028.9 0.99 0.99 0.980.97 0 96 
volume 
(contracts) 
HSI Futures 5122 6126.5 0.93 0 .910900.89 0.89 
open interest 
Table 4.2 Sample Autocorrelation Coefficient of 
Trading Activities Series and their Innovations 
generated bv an ARMAa2.D process 
Spot Trading Futures Trading Volume Open Interest 
Volume 
1 0.81*** 0.98*** 0.85講 
2 0.69*** 0.97*** 0.80*** 
3 0.61*** 0.95*** 0.77*** 
4 0.56*** 0.94*** 0.77*** 
5 0.51*** 0.92*** 0.75*** 
6 0.48*** 0.90*** 0.72*** 
7 0.46嫩 0.89*** 0.73*** 
8 0.46*** 0.87*** 0.70*** 
9 0.44謂 0.85 議 0.70*** 
10 0.43*** 0.84講 0.68*** 
11 0.42*** 0.83*** 0.65*** 
12 0.39*** 0.81*** 0.62*** 
Activities Innovations 
1 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
4 0 -0.01 0.01 
5 0 0 0 
6 0 0 -0.01 
7 0 0 -0.01 
8 0 0.01 0 
9 0 0.01 z -0.01 
10 0 0.01 -0.02 
11 0 0.03 -0.01 
12 0.01 0.05* ^02 
Notes: All the trading activities have been detrended before 
subject to correlation coefficient estimation. 
* denotes 10% level of significance 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.4 Summarizeri t^s for thP regression nf 
daily HSI retnrn stanHarH deviation H^m^ t^  油 
Soot - Trading Vnlump nniy 
Test statistics for individual coefficients are t-statistics for the 
hypothesis that the coefficient is zero, estimated using WMte 
(1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Test 
statistics for 10 lags variables are F-statistics for the 
hypothesis that the sum of the ten lag coefficient is zero. 
COEFFICIENT | T-STATISTICS 
INTERCEPT 0.33809 2.986 ** 
DAILY DUMMIES 
Monday 0.78649 4.609 ** 
Tuesday 0.25017 2.958 ** 
Wednesday 0.07237 0.9774 
Thursday 0.13498 1.844 
SPOT TRADING 
VOLUME 
Expected 0.07306 1.744 
Unexpected 0.68425 4.262 ** 
Moving Average 0.15463 3.919 ** 
10 lagged volatility 0.52452 6.8522 ** 
estimates (sum) 
10 lagged unexpected -0.38815 -2.6703 ** 
returns (sum) 
Observations 1996 
Durbin Watson 2.0512 
R-Square 0.3507 
* represents statistical significance at 0.10 level. 
** represents statistical significance at 0.05 level 
“ V 
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Table 4.5 Summarized tests for the regression of 
daily HSI return standard deviation estimates on 
Spot - and Futures - Trading Vnlnmp 
Test statistics for individual coefficients are t-statistics for the 
hypothesis that the coefficient is zero, estimated using White 
(1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Test 
statistics for 10 lags variables are F-statistics for the 
hypothesis that the sum of the ten lag coefficient is zero. 
COEFFICIENT 1 T-STATISTICS 
INTERCEPT 0.45633 3.341 ** 
DAILY DUMMIES 
Monday 0.77385 5.079 ** 
Tuesday 0.25812 3.037 ** 
Wednesday 0.08566 1.150 
Thursday 0.14077 1.928 
SPOT TRADING 
VOLUME 
Expected 0.09740 1.839 
Unexpected 0.69774 3.939 ** 




Expected -0.03244 -0.8148 
Unexpected 0.32505 0.6112 
Moving Average -0.22831 -0.0838 
OPEN INTEREST 
Expected -0.23569 -0.4917 
Unexpected -0.18438 -0.5691 
Moving Average 0.44232 1.233 
10 lagged volatility 0.4339 4.4767 ** 
estimates (sum) 
10 lagged unexpected -0.45645 -2.9663 ** 
returns (sum) 
Observations 1996 
Durbin Watson 2.0508 
R-Square 03512 
* represents statistical significance at 0.10 level. 
** represents statistical significance at 0.05 level 
,» 
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Table 4.6 Summarized tests for th^  regression of 
daily HSI return standard deviation estimates on 
Contract Life Cvcle 
Test statistics for individual coefficients are t-statistics for the 
hypothesis that the coefficient is zero，estimated using White 
(1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Test 
statistics for 10 lags variables are F-statistics for the 
hypothesis that the sum of the ten lag coefficient is zero. 
COEFFICIENT | T-STATISTICS 
INTERCEPT 0.34529 2.247 ** 
DAILY DUMMIES 
Monday 0.60336 3.716 ** 
Tuesday 0.06057 0.706 
Wednesday 0.07401 1.027 
Thursday 0.14985 1.912 
Contract life Cycle -0.003545 -1.077 
10 lagged volatility 0.53955 6.591 _ 
estimates (sum) 
10 lagged unexpected -0.22271 -1.991 ** 
returns (sum) 
Observations 1996 
Durbin Watson 2.009 
R-Square 0.1934 
* represents statistical significance at 0.10 level. 
** represents statistical significance at 0.05 level 
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Chapter 5. Margin, Policy 
Brokers and Exchange Authority require customers 
to provide deposits called margins when they trade in 
futures markets. Minimum margin levels are set by the 
exchange and brokers must set margin requirements for 
the i r customers at least equal to the minimum. The 
margin management of Futures Exchange has come under 
attack a f t e r the October 1987 Crash as i t could not 
provide adequate protection to the Exchange against 
the default of the cl ients and the low margin level 
boosted up speculative ac t iv i t i e s . 
In fact , a f t e r the Crash, the margin policy in 
futures market has aroused many academicians
1 
in te res t . Some investigated, the validi ty of the 
Excess Vola t i l i ty Hypothesis and the Prudential 
Exchange Hypothesis• Excess Volat i l i ty Hypothesis 
suggests that vo la t i l i t y produced by speculative 
trading can be controlled by increasing margins, 
hence to increase the trading cost. On the other 
hand, the Prudential Exchange hypothesis suggests 
that Futures Exchange raises margin level when 
vo l a t i l i t y increases in order to compensate for the 
increased r isk . 
Meanwhile, another line of research focuses on 
relationships between margins and the probability of 
default; and factors affecting margin determination. 
In th is chapter,工 will investigate two aspects 
of the margin policy. One is to investigate the 
margining behavior of Hong Kong Futures Exchange by 
calculating the probability of the HSI futures prices 
movement that could exhaust a given margin. The 
second conaerns whether the i n i t i a l margin can curb 
speculative vo la t i l i t y by examining the short-run 
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re la t ionship between changes in margin and changes in 
v o l a t i l i t y of HSI futures prices. 
5.1 The Economic Role of Futures Margin 
I t i s not surprising that Futures Market 
Clearinghouse is in an unique position to fine tune 
i t s r i sk exposure through active management of 
i n i t i a l margin requirements. Futures contracts are 
marked to market at the end of each trading day, 
contract gains and loses are se t t led daily. The 
Clearinghouse stands at the center of the settlement 
process, receives and disburses to and from clearing 
members. Hence, the risk outstanding on the 
clearing^s member positions can be reflected by the 
margin remained in their accounts. In this way, the 
clearinghouse can manage i t s r isk exposure by active 
use of margin requirements
1
-. 
In the l i t e ra tu re , the importance of futures 
margin requirements has been stressed. Figlewski 
(1984) claims that the futures margin is in a unique 
posi t ion to protect the financial in tegr i ty of the 
contract . The Futures Exchange should manage the 
margin level so that the risk of default could be 
eliminated as far as possible. Fishe and Goldberg 
(1986) also share the same opinion with Figlewski. 
They fur ther develop a model to i l l u s t r a t e the margin 
se t t ing behavior. According to the i r model, margin 
se t t ing author i t ies should increase margin levels 
when factors contributing to ^the market ins tab i l i ty 
increase the probabili ty of defaul t . Berranke (1990) 
suggests that Clearinghouse acting as the guarantor 
on the futures contracts encourages investors 
par t ic ipa t ion , which in turn enhances l iquidi ty of 
the market. .And margins, are a principal mean for the 
,* 
1 Margin levels are based on the risk of default to the Futures Exchange and so depends on the 
probability of price changes of certain magnitudes. 
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clearinghouse to protect themselves against default 
r i sk . 
Accordingly, the authori t ies should be cautious 
in managing the margin levels in order to insulate 
themselves from traders ' default r i sk . However, 
margin should not be set to a level beyond guarantee 
performance. I t is because margin, is simply a form 
of transaction cost, increasing the cost may 
discourage part icipat ion, result ing in diminishing 
l iqu id i ty , which in turn makes the futures market 
more d i f f i c u l t to perform i t s economic function. 
5 • 2a Theoretical Foundation of the relationship 
between Margin Requirement and Futures Volatility 
For the discussions on the relationships between 
margin requirements and price vo l a t i l i t y . There are 
some theoret ical models to explain their 
relat ionships . 
Hartzmark (1986) sets up a model of futures 
market with heterogeneous trader groups. Different 
t raders will have thei r unique l iquidi ty cost and 
r isk- tolerance. When margin requirements are changed, 
the composition of the trading groups in the market 
wil l be affected, result ing in adjustment of 
equilibrium price level, vo l a t i l i t y and open 
i n t e r e s t . Thus, the changes in margin requirements 
have ambiguous effect on the vo l a t i l i t y . I t depends 
on which trading groups are a t t racted to, or 
eliminated from the market. 
Kupiec and Sharpe (1990) examine the effects of 
i n i t i a l margin requirements on the stock price 
v o l a t i l i t y ,by using a simple overlapping generation 
model. According to the i r model, the influence of 
noise traders and the differences in risk-tolerance 
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of agents contribute to asset price vo la t i l i t y , while 
margin requirements can constraint the demands of 
optimist ic noise-traders when asset prices are 
r i s ing, result ing in lower vo la t i l i t y , they can also 
r e s t r i c t the demands of risk-tolerance investors when 
prices are fa l l ing, leading to higher vo la t i l i t y . 
Therefore, whether r is ing margin can reduce 
v o l a t i l i t y depends on which types of traders are 
r e s t r i c t ed from trading. 
From the above models, i t can be seen that the 
e f fec t of margin changes on price vo l a t i l i t y is not 
c lear . The net effect depends on the type of traders 
removed from the market and hence whether the 
speculative or l iquidi ty effect dominates. 
5.2b Empirical Evidence of Margin Requirement and 
Price Volatility 
Empirically, Fishe, Goldberg, Gosnell and Senha 
(1990) investigate the ef fec t of changes in margin on 
the vo l a t i l i t y of futures prices of ten commodities. 
They find that there is an inconsistent relationship 
between margin changes and price vo la t i l i t y . The 
resu l t s suggest that there does not exist a stable 
pat tern for the government to control market 
v o l a t i l i t y . Schwertz (1989), Kupiec (1989), Salinger 
(1989) and Hsieh and Miller (1990) have empirically 
investigated the hypothesis whether i n i t i a l margin 
requirements and stock price vo l a t i l i t y are inversely 
re la ted . They find no s t a t i s t i c a l support for a 
negative margin-volati l i ty relationship. However, the 
l a t t e r conclusions may be invalid as the s t a t i s t i c a l 
power to detect a margin-volati l i ty relationship may 
be low as Federal Reserve Board has changed margin * ^ 
requirements so infrequently and investors can 
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subs t i tu te for other form of leverage, such as using 
stock index futures contract. 
James T.Mose (1992) examines the relation 
between the S&P 500 index futures vo la t i l i t y and 
margin levels in order to assess the p laus ib i l i ty of 
the Excess Vola t i l i ty Argument and the Prudential 
Exchange Hypothesis。 He concludes that changes in 
futures margins do not lead to changes in vo la t i l i t y . 
Paul H.Kupiec (1993) finds that high margin rates in 
the futures market tend to be associated with periods 
of above average vo l a t i l i t y in the cash market. The 
reasons may be that high margins may reduce l iquidi ty 
in the futures market and thereby increase price 
v o l a t i l i t y . Jonathan D. Jones (1993) reexamines the 
short-run relationship between the i n i t i a l margin 
requirement and stock vo l a t i l i t y with daily 
observations on both the Dow Jones and Standard and 
Poor's Price Indexes for the 23 i n i t i a l margin 
changes from October 1934 through January 1974, 
including the introduction of margins in October 
1934. After adjusting for s ignif icant leptokurtosis 
in both price indexes, he finds evidence of a strong, 
a lbe i t not consistently negative relat ion between 
margins and vo l a t i l i t y for event windows of 100 days. 
Hence, from the above empirical findings, the 
debate on the relationships between price vo l a t i l i t y 
and i n i t i a l margin is s t i l l unsett led. 
In the next section, the management behavior of 
margin set t ing of HKFE will be examined, followed by 
the hypothesis test ing on the relationship between 
margin requirement and futures vo l a t i l i t y . 
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5.3 HSI Fnfures Marrrin RecruirPTnent and Probabilitv 
of Exhaustion 
As the SRC Report asserted that the Futures 
Exchange does not perform well on their risk 
management, in th is section, the management behavior 
of margin set t ing by Futures Exchange is 
investigated. 
Gay, Hunter and Kolb (1986) derive a model to 
calculate the probabili ty that the futures price 
movement could exhaust a given margin. They assume 
that futures prices follow a Wiener process
2
 and 
calculate the probabili ty (Z) that the margin will be 
exhausted during some interval through fluctuation in 
the futures price. The probabili ty (Z) is given by: 
「分似）1 
L \o4T)\ 
where M is a given level of margin 
T is the time period for which a given 
margin level will be exhausted 
C is the standard deviation of futures 
price 
0 is the cumulative dis t r ibut ion function 
for a standard normal variate . 
The probabili ty of exhaustion is calculated for 
each trading days. Since daily settlement is adopted 
in the local market, so T is set to one. The standard 
deviation of futures price is computed by the so -
called "30-trading day root- t rol l" vo la t i l i t y 
estimate, in which return standard deviations are 
estimated from a moving sample of 30 days from the 
immediate past. This estimate is used because Fenn 
2 h this way, futures price will generate a normal density, zero mean, stationary independent 
increment process with a variance of cr t. 
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a n d K u p i e c
 (
1 9 9 3
) claims that the clearinghouse use 
t h l S a S o n e o f t h e
 several vo l a t i l i t y estimators. 
Of course, th is estimation suffers from a number 
of l imi ta t ions . Among them, one is the futures 
returns are not normally distr ibuted while the 
v o l a t i l i t y estimator i s also not representative. 
However, the objective here is only to give us an 
idea of the behavior of margin set t ing of HKFE. So 
our findings are i l l u s t r a t i ve , not conclusive. For a 
more rigorous examination, i t leaves behind for 
future research. 
Moreover, the above analysis does not suggest a 
' sa fe’ margin level for the Futures Exchange to stick 
on i t . In fact , d i f ferent Exchanges should set their 
o w n
 margin levels according to thei r unique trading 
environment, with higher level in an adverse trading 
condition. 




Table 5.2 reports days on which close-to-close 
contract value changes exceed required margin level• 
The margin requirements have been exhausted only nine 
times in seven and a half years. 
Table 5.3 reports the history of the probability 
of exhaustion of margin level for the period 1986-
1993, estimating by Eq(l)• 
From Table 5.3, i t can be observed that the 
probabi l i ty of exhaustion before the October Crash is 
substant ia l ly larger than that of a f t e r the Crash. 
So the claim that the underlying cause of Hong 
3 initial margin for clearing member is set by FE and ClearingHouse while the client's levels 
are set by respective brokerage houses and may not be in line with the member level. 
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Kong's unique experience of the October collapse was 
poor r i sk management and lax credit control in the 
Futures market has i t s j u s t i f i c a t i on . In fact , the 
mean level of probabil i ty of exhaustion is about 20% 
in 1986 and 17% in 1987, but within 10% afterwards. 
Especially, in 1988, the margin level is set to such 
a high level that the mean level of probabili ty of 
exhaustion i s only 0.027%. In 1989, 1990 and 1991, 
the mean levels are 2.7%, 4.8% and 4.7% respectively, 
implying that the clearinghouse is more conservative 
or prudential in set t ing i n i t i a l margin requirement. 
Hence, the HKFE seems to act upon the recommendation 
of the Securi t ies Report Report: 
“••.in view of the default r isk 
in Hong Kong, i t may be 
appropriate for the HKFE and the 
CH to use a high confidence 
factor in se t t ing margin 
levels .”(pp.204) 
Besides, before the Crash, margin requirement 
has only changed 3 times in one and a half years. 
After the Crash, there are 18 changes in six years. 
More importantly, a f t e r examining the probabili ty 
se r ies , whenever the probabil i ty climbs to a high 
level , the margin level will be adjusted in response. 
In fac t , from the evidence that the Futures Exchange 
can withstand the adverse trading condition during 
the period of June 4 Bei j ing incident and the 
invasion of Iraq into Kuwait广 i t manifests that the 
Futures Exchange seems to be more mature in r isk 




5.4 HSI FntnrPs Jlargin and HSI 
Volatilit-y * 
. A n o t h e r controversy about Margin Policy is that 
rais ing the costs of trading, by increasing the 
i n i t i a l margin requirement, can lower the volume of 
destabi l iz ing speculative ac t iv i ty and hence, futures 
price vo l a t i l i t y (Excess Volat i l i ty Argument)
4
 . 
However, rais ing the cost of trading will dimiiiish 
the l iqu id i ty of the market and hence lead to an 
increase of vo l a t i l i t y . So, whether margin changes 
can increase or decrease the vo l a t i l i t y depends on 
whether the speculative or l iquidi ty effect 
accompanied with the changes dominates. Note, the 
causal i ty in the above argument is from changes in 
margin to vo l a t i l i t y changes. On the other hand, 
there i s another line of thought, which claims that 
i n i t i a l margin increases are due to the increase in 
price vo l a t i l i t y (Prudential Exchange Hypothesis) • In 
th i s way, when price vo l a t i l i t y increases, margin 
will r i se in response, the causality is run from 
changes in vo l a t i l i t y to changes in margin. This 
section will examine the short - run relationship 
between i n i t i a l margin and the HSI futures price 
vo l a t i l i t y . 
5.4a Event-Study Approach 
To examine the short-term relat ion between 
margins and vo la t i l i t y , event-study approach is 
employed f i r s t to give us a fresh look at the data. 
The standard deviations of daily futures price 
returns before and a f t e r the margin changes are 
estimated and F s t a t i s t i c s is then used to tes t for 
the equality of the two variances. 
: V 
4 for this statement to be valid, initial margin should be less costly than leverage obtained 
from other sources; otherwise, investors can substitute other means for obtaining loans. 
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Ho ： Q pre = CJ^ post 
HI ： Cj2pre 本 0"2pOSt 
Because of the low cost of futures trading, i t is 
supposed that the responses to changes in margin are 
l ike ly to be quickly observed. Moreover, in order to 
avoid the overlapping of event periods
5
 , event 
windows of 5-day, 10-day 20-day and 30-day are 
chosen. Since two consecutive margin changes occur 
during the two interval ： 87/10/19 and 87/10/26, 
89/5/25 and 89/5/26, the two consecutive margin 
changes are considered as one effect ive margin 
changes. Hence, the number of margin changes are 
reduced from 21 to 19 through the period May 6 1986 
to Dec 31 1993. 
Table 5.4 reports the effect ive day of margin 
changes and the standard F-test on the return 
standard deviation of HSI futures prices with 5-day, 
10-day and 2 0 -day event windows. The tes ts are 
conducted at the 10% and 5% levels of significance. 
The F - s t a t i s t i c s are computed as the ra t io of the 
post-change variance to the pre - change variance. 
For 5- day event window, only 2 out of 19 changes 
are 5% signif icant at the conventional F t es t . For 
10-day event window, only 4 out of 14 changes are 
s ign i f ican t , with two are s ignif icant at 5% level and 
the remaining two cases at 10% level. For 20-day, 
only 3 out of 9 changes are s ignif icant . For 3 0-day, 
4 out of 8 changes are s ignif icant . Moreover, the 
s ignif icant cases mainly cluster around the October 
Crash 1987. Due to the extreme environment of the 
market during this period, i t i s highly suspected 
that the vo l a t i l i t y changes before and af te r the 
- , 
5 overlapping problem may affect the conclusions in the following ways: 1) it is hard to 
isolate the impact of one margin change when simultaneously two changes are affecting the 
futures returns, 2) it is possible that the effect of pre-change period of one margin change may 
be captured in the post-change period of the previous change in margins. 
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margin changes i s primarily due to the margin change 
i t s e l f , in addition, i t is revealed that the longer 
e V e n t w i n d o w
‘
 t h e
 higher the portion of significant 
changes to insignif icant changes. However, the longer 
event window may pick up the ef fec ts of confounding 
events not related to the i n i t i a l margin changes. So 
higher portion of signif icant changes of variances 
for longer event window can not ful ly support the 
existence of short-run relat ion between i n i t i a l 
margin and futures price vo l a t i l i t y . 
Moreover, for those signif icant cases, the 
direct ion of changes in variances for margin changes 
are also mixed. I t is revealed that no matter the 
margin i s increased or decreased, the price 
vo l a t i l i t y will increase at a l l time, contradicting 
the view that when margin increases, vo l a t i l i t y 
decreases . 
The above resul ts show that the relationships 
between i n i t i a l margin and price vo l a t i l i t y are 
ambiguous. In fact , event study approach has the 
shortcoming that you cannot infer the causality 
between changes in margin and changes in vo l a t i l i t y . 
Moreover, th i s approach ignores the fact that the 
magnitude of margin changes may affect the direction 
and magnitude of changes in vo l a t i l i t y . In addition, 
v o l a t i l i t y clustering of daily futures returns may 
a f fec t the resul t when using event window approach. 
So a new estimate procedure seems to be necessary. 
5.4b ALTERNATIVE METHOD 
Schwert (1990) and Davidson and Carroll (1987) 
introduce a new econometric technique to obtain 
unbiased estimates of conditional daily return 
standard deviation, in which the method can 
accoinmodate the persistence of vo la t i l i t y and the 
66 
asymmetrical relat ion between vo l a t i l i t y and price 
level . This procedure involves i te ra t ion between a 
pai r of equation
6
. 






= a + i K p. at.j + +et (3) 
/VO 
where R( = 1 0 0 * l n ( P t / P t . i s the return of HSI 
futures prices at time t 
dmt i s percentage change in margin requirement at 
t ime t . 
Eq(l) estimates the conditional expected returns 
of HSI futures. Eq(3) estimates the conditional 
standard deviation of returns. In order to assess the 
impacts of margin changes on the futures vo la t i l i ty , 
ra tes of margin changes which occur before the date 
of observed vo l a t i l i t y (margin change "lags") and 
occur a f t e r the date of observed vo l a t i l i t y (margin 
change "leads") are added in a regression, Eq(3), 
having vo l a t i l i t y as the dependent variables. The 
coeff ic ient of the lag and lead margin changes are 
then relevant to tes t for the Prudential Exchange 
Hypothesis and Excess Vola t i l i ty Hypothesis. In these 
studies, margin changes that occurred up to f i f t een 
t • 
6 F0r detailed explanation of the estimation procedure and variables, please refer to Chapter 4 
-Price volatility of this thesis. 
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Since Futures Exchanges response to a r ise in 
v o l a t i l i t y by r is ing margins, we should observe 
posi t ive coeff ic ients on margin changes occurring 
a f t e r observed vo l a t i l i t y . 
On the other hand, proponents of Excess 
Vo la t i l i t y Argument assert increasing margin to 
reduce vo l a t i l i t y . So we should observe a negative 
coeff ic ient on margin changes occurring before 
observed vo l a t i l i t y to affirm the Excess Volat i l i ty 
Hypothesis. Of course, an increase in margin level 
may increase vo l a t i l i t y due to reduce l iquidi ty, this 
wil l be called as Insufficient Liquidity Hypothesis 
in th i s paper. 
Table 5.6 summaries the tes t s for the Prudential 
Exchange Hypothesis. This hypothesis predicts a 
posi t ive association between vo l a t i l i t y and 
subsequent margin changes. Coefficients on lead 3 and 
11 are 10% level of significance. Both of the lead 
coef f ic ien ts are positive, so i t seems that the 
resu l t support the Prudential Exchange Hypothesis. 
However, since the effect of a margin change may be 
spread across several days, producing a cumulative 
e f fec t riot evidence on any one day, coefficients sum 
is also examined. The coefficient sum is 0.1317, 
which i s posi t ive. However, F-test result indicates 
that the ' coeff ic ients sum does not s ignif icantly 
d i f f e r from zero. Hence, the evidences of the 
Prudential Exchange Hypothesis are not persuasive. 
Table 5.7 summaries the tes t for the Excess 
Vola t i l i t y Argument. Note that some of the 
7
 15 trading days are used because the responses to a change in margin are likely to be quickly 
observed owing to the low cost of trading in futures market. Alternatively, 10 and 20 tradings 
days are also used in the estimation with the results unaltered. 
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coeff ic ien ts of margin changes before observed 
v o l a t i l i t y are negative and some are positive. All 
coef f ic ien ts are not s ignif icant except lag 14 which 
i s s ignif icant and has the expected sign - negative. 
The coeff ic ients sum is -0.12185, which is negative. 
But when the resul t is tested against 0 with an F-
t e s t . The coeff icient sum does not d i f f e r reliably 
from zero. Hence, the resul ts do not support the 
Excess Vola t i l i ty Argument which asserts that 
v o l a t i l i t y and margin changes has a negative 
relat ionship 
〇n the other hand, the resul ts put evidence on 
the persistence of vo l a t i l i t y of futures prices, but 
not the asyimmetirical relat ion between vo la t i l i t y and 
price level . 
As a conclusion, the margin does not seem to 
a f fec t the futures prices vo l a t i l i t y . Neither Excess 
Vola t i l i ty Argument nor Prudential Exchange 
Hypothesis are supported by the resul t s . Hence, i t is 
not j u s t i f i ed to claim that the low margin 
requirement leads to more vola t i le of futures market 
or the Futures Exchange should raise i n i t i a l margin 
requirements to curb speculative ac t iv i t i e s . In fact , 
the resul t s in Part 1 indicate that raising margin 
may increase the vo l a t i l i t y instead. 
Finally, we cannot provide evidence to support 
the Prudential Exchange Hypothesis may be due to the 
fact that margin requirement is already in a high 
level to cover extra r i sk . This can be reflected by 
the low probabili ty of exhaustion of margin level 
examined in section 5.2. So even vo la t i l i t y 
increases, the Futures Exchange does not need to 
increase margin requirement in response. 
• * 
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5.5 HSI FUTURES T,R\7ERAGE AND PRICE VCKATILITY 
The above discussion only examines the 
relat ionship between the change in margin level and 
f u t u r e s
 P
r i c e
 vo l a t i l i t y . However, some may argue 
that i t i s the high leverage ra t io of HSI futures 
contract which contributes to the vo la t i l i t y , not 
jus t the level of margin requirement. Therefore, in 
th i s section, the relationships between leverage 
r a t io and price vo l a t i l i t y will be unearthed. 
The leverage ra t io (LR) is defined as the margin 
level dividing by the contract value. 
Lr 一 M arg in Re quirement 
Futures Settlement Pr ice x 50 
In th i s way, when LR is high, i t means that the 
margin level is high when compared with the contract 
value。 And i t is suspected that low leverage rat io 
lead to high vo l a t i l i t y and high leverage rat io will 
have low vo l a t i l i t y . 
Equation (3) is estimated with dmt replaced by 
DLRt - the percentage change in leverage ra t io . 
Results are summarized in Table 5.8 and 5.9. 
I t i s discovered that the R-Square is increased 
from 0.3315 to 0.5050, indicating that the leverage 
ra t io can explain prices vo l a t i l i t y much bet ter than 
the margin levels . Coefficient on lead 6 is positive 
and s ignif icant , while coefficient on lag 3 is 
posi t ive and…lag——U 9 are negative. Hence, i t seems 
that the Prudential Exchange hypothesis is compelling 
while the Excess Volat i l i ty Hypothesis is 
inconclusive. When the signs of the coefficient sums 
of lead and
:
 lagged leverage ra t io are'examined, both 
are coincident with the respective Hypothesis. 
However, the coefficient sums are a l l insignificant 
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at the 10% level . Again, neither the hypothesis is 
supported by the evidence. 
Consequently, Futures Exchange should not t reat 
margin requirement as a tool to curb speculative 
ac t iv i ty . in fact # increasing margin may be 
detrimental to the development of the market because 
ra is ing costs may lead to lower l iquidi ty of the 
market. In th is way, i t is more d i f f i cu l t for the 
futures market to perform i t s r i sk- t ransfer function 
and vo l a t i l i t y may also increase. 
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Table 5.1 Tnit-jal Margir, n q p o s i t f n T . H g I F u t u r R R 
D a t e


















12/07/92 $20,000 $27,500 
05/03/93 $22,500 $30,000 
10/12/93 $25,000 $35,000 
11/01/93 $30,000 $42,500 
12/22/93 $40,000 $50,000 
01/07/94 $50,000 $62,500 




Table 5.2 Day.g on which change i n m n t r a c t Va l”P 
Exceed Required Margin T.w^i 
Date Change in Margin Level 
Contract Value 
10/07/86 3500 3000 
10/19/87 18050 10000 
10/26/87 77700 25000 
05/22/89 18650 15000 
06/05/89 32850 26500 
08/06/90 13750 10000 
08/28/90 10150 10000 
08/28/91 15700 10000 




Table 5.3 Probability of Exhaustion of Margin RemH^^nh 
—— Min. Max. Mean STD. 
1 9 8 6
 0.00015 0.5419 0.1957 0.1697 
1 9 8 7
 0.000002 0.5858 0.1736 0.1534 
1987(01/01-10/16) 0.00003 0.3629 0.1477 0.1033 
1987(10/19-12/31) 0.000002 0.5858 0.2779 0.2484 
1 9 8 8
 0 0.0084 0.0003 0.0012 
1 9 8 9
 0 0.3246 0.0274 0.0677 
1989(01/01-06/04) 0 0.6427 0.0102 0.1687 
1989(06/05-12/31) 0 0.3246 0.0367 0.8554 
1990 0 0.4554 0.0485 0.1061 
1991 1E-08 0.2578 0.0476 0.0746 
1992 0.00001 0.4565 0.1294 0.1345 
1993 2E-09 0.4465 0.0925 0.1084 
Note: Daily volativity is calculated using 30-days RTR. 
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^
b l e 5
.
4 n f
 F-test on H.gx P#” r e s v o l a H "H 〜 
before and d f e r Margin 〜 ， 
" "~F-test on HSI 
Effective Date Margin (pre and post event windows) 
of Margin Change Change 5-days 1 Q-days 20-days 30 days 
10/08/86 Increase 1.548 1.808 2.562 2.341 
01/12/87 Increase 2.195 2.018 1.344 1.115 
08/14/87 Increase 2.505 3.060 2.486 2.414 
10/19/87 Increase 101.620 88.017 30.255 
10/26/87 Increase ** ** 
03/31/88 Decrease 1.042 2.962 1.689 1 716 
* * 
07/15/88 Decrease 8.735 1.475 1.610 1 443 
05/25/89 Increase 0.126 3.374 
05/26/89 Increase 
06/20/90 Decrease 0.328 
07/06/90 Decrease 0.599 
02/22/91 Decrease 0.411 0.417 
03/22/91 Decrease 0.900 1.773 
03/02/92 Increase 0.639 0.691 1.063 2.457 
05/28/92 Increase 0.873 0.697 1.094 1.154 
11/02/92 . Increase 0.370 0.392 
12/07/92 Increase 0.345 0.475 
05/03/93 Increase 1.001 0.782 0.374 0.461 
10/12/93 Increase 3.662 
11/01/93 Increase 0.494 
12/22/93 Increase 0.670 
Note: * ** denotes the significance at 5% and 10% level 
respectively. 
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Table 5.5 Summary of Hypothesis on HSI Futures Volat i l i tv 
_„ . F-testonHSI 
Effective Date (pre and post event windows) 
of Margin Change b-days Hyp. 10-days Hyp. 20-days Hyp. 30 days Hyp" 
10/08/86 1.548 N 1.808 N 2.562 + 2 341 + 
01/12/87 2.195 N 2.018 N 1.344 N 1:115 N 
08/14/87 2.505 N 3.060 + 2.486 + 2.414 + 
10/19/87 101.620 + 88.017 + 30.255 + 
10/26/87 
03/31/88 1.042 N 2.962 - 1.689 N 1.716 -
07/15/88 8.735 - 1.475 N 1.610 N 1.443 N 
05/25/89 0.126 N 3.374 + 
05/26/89 
06/20/90 0.328 N 
07/06/90 0.599 N 
02/22/91 0.411 N 0.417 N 
03/22/91 0.900 N 1.773 N 
03/02/92 0.639 N 0.691 N 1.063 N 2.457 + 
05/28/92 0.873 N 0.697 N 1.094 N 1.154 N 
11/02/92 0.370 N 0.392 N 
12/07/92 0.345 N 0.475 N 
05/03/93 1.001 N 0.782 N 0.374 N 0.461 N 
10/12/93 3.662 N 
11/01/93 0.494 N 
12/22/93 0.670 N 
Note: + denotes positive relation; - denotes negative 
relationship; N denotes no relationship. 
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A^^ LE 5.6 Summary nf Test for th(k 
Exchange Hypoth^ i^  hy 丨丨sing margin rhanpAg 
e^st statistics for individual coefficients are t-statistics for the 
noQ°m
eS1S t h E t t h e c o e f f l c i e n t i s
 zero, estimated using White 
(1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Test 
statistics for 15 lags variables are F-statistics for the hypothesis 
that the sum of the fifteen lag coefficients is zero. 
Trading days pr ior to Lead Margin Change t - r a t i o 
a margin change Coefficient 
1
 0.41464e-01 1.871 
2
 -0.32531e-01 -1.624 
3
 0.61321e-01 2.254* 
4
 -0.13023e-01 -0.4772 
5
 0.20818e-01 0.8883 
6
 -0.15442e-01 -1.147 
7
 -0.20205e-01 -1.763 
8
 0.97091e-03 0.04414 
9
 0.24412e-01 0.7478 
1 0
 -0.35379e-01 -1.836 
11 0.49808e-01 2.642* 
12 -0.45707e-01 -0.9464 
13 0.13039 1.411 
14 -0.35308e-01 -1.392 
15 0.14686e-03 0.00585 
coefficient sums 0.131736 1.6917 
10 lagged 0.7750 9.627** 
volat i l i ty 
estimates (sum) 




R-SQUARE 0.3 315 
Durbin Watson 2.0377 
* represents statistical significance at 0.10 level. 




TABLE 5.7 Summary of t^t for the Eyc^s 
Volatility Hvpoth样h bv using margin changes 
Test statistics for individual coefficients are t-statistics for the 
hypothesis that the coefficient is zero, estimated using White 
(1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Test 
statistics for 15 lags variables are F-statistics for the hypothesis 
that the sum of the fifteen lag coefficients is zero. 
Trading days a f te r a Lagged Margin 
margin change Change Coefficient t - r a t i o 
1
 -0.24491e-01 -0.2208 
2
 -0.20706e-02 -0.07657 
3
 -0.45631e-01 -1.424 
4
 -0.75124e-01 -1.779 
5
 -0.71850e-02 -0.24 
6
 0.15666e-01 0.5379 
7
 0.42073e-01 0.7665 
8 -0.36053e-01 -1.154 
9 -0.44321e-01 -1.261 
10 0.31000e-02 0.1329 
11 0.10496e-01 0.4079 
12 0.23736e-01 1.941 
13 0.12320e-01 1.114 
14 -0.32174e-01 -2.201* 
15 0.37812e-01 1.728 
coefficient sums -0.12185 0.7394 
10 lagged 0.7750 9.627** 
vola t i l i ty 
estimates (sum) 





Durbin Watson 2.0377 
* represents statistical significance at 0.10 level. 




TABLE 5.8 Summary of t^ t for the PriiriMi^ l 
Exchange Hypothesis hy using rutin 
Test statistics for individual coefficients are t-statistics for the 
hypothesis that the coefficient is zero, estimated using White 
(1980? heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Test 
statistics for 15 lags variables are F-statistics for the hypothesis 
that the sum of the fifteen lag coefficients is zero. 
Trading days pr ior to Lead Leverage t - r a t i o 
a Leverage Ratio Ratio Change 
change Coefficient 
1
 -0.26433e-01 -0.7315 
2
 0.14464e-01 0 .3046 
3
 0.58637e-01 1.491 
4
 -0.21493e-01 -0.5201 
5
 -0.29928e-01 -0.8401 
6
 0.62483e-01 2.289** 
7
 0.17534e-01 0.5938 
8 0。33426e-02 0.1315 
9 -0.19009e-01 -0.4903 
10 -0.51228e-02 -0.2810 
11 0.26712e-01 1.230 
12 -0。22399e-01 -1.315 
13 0。63810e-01 1.817 
14 0.36392e-01 0.8998 
15 0.59832e-02 0.4281 
coefficient sums 0.164973 2.7996 
10 lagged 0.8230 10.631** 
volatility-
estimates (sum) 





Durbin Watson 1.9639 
* represents statistical significance at 0.10 level. 
** represents statistical significance at 0.05 level 
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TABLE 5.9 Summary of t^ t for the Kxc^  
Volatility Hypothesis hy using J ^ r ^ Ji^ tin 
Test statistics for individual coefficients are t-statistics for the 
hypothesis that the coefficient is zero, estimated using White 
(1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Test 
statistics for 15 lags variables are F-statistics for the hypothesis 
that the sum of the fifteen lag coefficients is zero. 
Trading days a f t e r a Lagged Leverage 
Leverage Ratio change Ratio Change t - r a t i o 
Coefficient 
1
 0.11151e-01 0.1470 
2
 -0.59169e-01 -1.346 
3
 0.59309e-01 2.314** 
4
 0.77605e-03 0.03224 
5
 -0.38500e-02 -0.1510 
6
 0.23098e-01 1.025 
7
 0.55824e-01 1.257 
8
 -0.62450e-01 -2.736** 
9 -0.81310e-01 -2.398** 
10 0.15816e-01 0.6751 
11 -0.27163e-01 -1.314 
12 0.22453e-01 1.195 
13 -0.11837e-01 -0.3782 
14 -0.25674e-01 -1.082 
15 -0.83449e-02 -0.6687 
coefficient sums -0.091371 0.79104 
10 lagged 0.8230 10.631** 
volat i l i ty 
estimates (sum) 




R-SQUARE 0 . 5050 
Durbin Watson 1.9639 
* represents statistical significance at 0.10 level 
** represents statistical significance at 0.05 level 
r • 
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Chapter 6. Concln^T nnc. 
Despite the short history of financial futures 
contract trading in Hong Kong, there have been 
constant controversies about th is market. in 
par t i cu la r , a f t e r the October Crash, the index 
futures market was accused of causing the Crash. 
Since then, a large amount of research has been 
conducted on issues related to financial futures 
market, for example, the pricing efficiency of the 
index futures contract and the effect of futures 
trading on the s t ab i l i t y of cash market. 
The HSI futures contract was introduced in 1986. 
A t
 one stage, the trading ac t iv i ty could rival that 
of the S&P 500 futures contracts. But, a f t e r Black 
Monday, trading languished and there was pressure to 
simply close down the HSI futures market. This thesis 
aims to answer several related questions which have 
been major concerns of academicians and regulators 
a f t e r the Crash. 
The f i r s t one is to investigate whether HSI 
futures perform i t s economic function well, by 
analyzing the lead/lag relat ionship between the rates 
of returns of HSI and the HSI futures contracts in 
the context of cointegration analysis. Several 
conclusions can be drawn from the estimation 
:1)Before the . Crash, the pricing efficiency of HSI 
futures was not e f f ic ien t and arbitrage ac t iv i t i e s 
could not link the . market ^ to the cash market 
e f fec t ive ly . In fact , the HSI futures at that time 
frequently traded at a very high premium which 
allowed the arbitrageurs to gain an annual return as 
high as 30%. One explanation for this is the over-
optimism about the bul l ish market which led to 
excess-speculation in the index futures. After the 
Crash, less informed speculators were eliminated from 
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the index futures market, thus the two markets were 
more mature and functioned more effect ively as one 
market. The result documents that the HSI futures 
market move largely in unison and can serve i t s 
designated role of hedging. 2) In contrast with the 
widely held opinion that futures market lead the spot 
market, the resul ts here suggest that a f te r the 
Crash, cash market led the futures market 
def in i t ive ly , and a f te r Tiananmen incident, feedback 
existed but s t i l l , the leading of cash market 
appeared to be in a more pronounced way. Futures 
market cannot provide price discovery role may be due 
to the market characteris t ics . Since cash market 
trading mainly concentrate on several constituent 
stocks, such as Hong Kong Telecom, which have 
s ignif icant impact on the index. Hence, security-
specif ic traders, which trade the individual stock, 
could af fec t the whole index and f i l t e r through to 
futures trading. 3) Spot and futures prices appear to 
be contemporaneously correlated on a daily basis and 
that lagged interactions, although s t a t i s t i ca l l y 
s igni f icant , are rather weak in magnitude so that 
the i r predictive power may not be economically 
important. This is consistent with weak-form 
eff iciency of both markets. 
Since the spot and HSI futures markets act as 
one uni t , one may suspect futures trading ac t iv i t ies 
might destabil ize the spot market by the so-called 
spil lover e f fec t . The second part of this thesis 
investigates this statement. By using Schwert (1990) 
procedure to obtain the unbiased standard deviation 
of HSI, spot and futures trading ac t iv i t ies are 
regressed on these vo la t i l i t y estimates. The trading 
ac t i v i t i e s are decomposed into three parts - the 100-
day moving 尹 v e r a g e to accommodate the secular volume 
^ Z y 
growth, the' expected and unexpected components of the 
detrended series to capture the effect of information 
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shocks. We find that spot price vo la t i l i t y is 
d i rec t ly related to spot market trading act ivi ty , 
with the unexpected component having larger ef fec t . 
This resul t is anticipated as information shocks move 
prices and generate trading at the same time. 
However, HSI futures trading ac t iv i t i e s (volume and 
open interes t ) are not relevant for the explanation 
of the index vo l a t i l i t y . Even if they had effects , 
t h e i n f l u e n c e w a s o n l y t o s t a b i l i z e t h e c a s h m a r k e t 
by reducing the spot market vo la t i l i t y , not 
increasing i t . Our resul ts are in l ine with Grossman 
(1988), who suggests that index arbitrage improves 
market depth. Furthermore, the relationship between 
the index vo l a t i l i t y and contract l i f e cycle is also 
examined. Spot price vo l a t i l i t y seems to increase 
when the HSI futures expiration day gets closer, but 
the ef fec t is s t a t i s t i c a l l y ins ignif icant . 
At th i s point, we can conclude that the 
existence of HSI Futures market can increase net 
social welfare by i t s hedging function as well as i t s 
s tab i l i z ing effect on the cash market. 
In the third, part of th is study, the margin 
policy of HSI futures contracts is explored. There 
are two aspects on th is issue. The f i r s t attempts to 
give us an idea of the management behavior of margin 
se t t ing by the Futures Exchange. By comparing the 
probabil i ty of exhaustion of margin level with 
d i f fe ren t periods, the authority seemed to allow lax 
control on the margin requirement before the Crash. 
The probabil i ty of exhaustion is nearest to 20% at 
that time, and a lot of investors ran away from their 
coinmitments by defaulting in the wake of the Crash. 
This put the margin policy at that time under attack. 
But a f t e r the Crash, the margin set t ing became more 
conservative and was able to withstand adverse 
trading condition, such as during the Tiananmen 
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incident. In th is way, October Crash had i t s merit as 
i t revealed the weakness of margin behavior of the 
Futures Exchange. 
The second is to uncover the relationship 
between margin level and futures vo l a t i l i t y . Using 
the event-study approach and Schwert (1990) 
estimation technique, the Excess Volat i l i ty 
Hypothesis i s certainly rejected while there is 
s l ight evidence on the Prudential Exchange 
Hypothesis. Consequently, raising margin level to 
curb speculative ac t i v i t i e s i s not supported. The 
resu l t s are not affected by using leverage rat io in 
place of margin level, though the explanatory power 
i s much stronger. 
A
s a conclusion, th i s thesis c l a r i f i e s some mis-
understanding on the local HSI futures market. The 
HSI futures market s tab i l izes , rather than 
des tabi l izes the cash market. In addition, i t has 
become more mature a f t e r the Black Monday and can 
serve well i t s designated role of hedging. Hence, i t s 
existence can increase social welfare. Lastly, the 
authori ty should not rely on margin policy to crowd 
out speculation as i t s action may only increase 
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Appendix 1 . 
DATA DESCRIPTION 
Sources of Dah^ • 
Hang Seng Index and Turnover are obtained from Hang 
Seng Index Services Ltd. 
HSI Futures daily settlement prices, Futures Trading 
Volume and Open Interest for various maturity, as 
well as the Margin History, are obtained from Hong 
Kong Futures Exchange. 
Part A - Dynamic Efficiency 
The data period span from 6 May 1986 to 31 Dec 1993. 
Data required: Hang Seng Index and HSI Futures price 
Since Futures contracts for several delivery 
months trade simultaneously, th is create the problem 
for choosing which contract prices to compute return 
ser ies . Following the l i t e ra tu re , the settlement 
prices for contract which are nearest to delivery is 
used. This means that most of the time, spot month 
HSI futures prices are used, as this is the heaviest 
traded and hence most representative of that day's 
trading. However, as the contract approach 
expiration, the spot month contract will ro l l over to 
the next month contract and the trading of the second 
month contract will gubstajitiarlly increased. In this 
way, in order to obtain the most representative 
return series, 工 will ro l l out of the spot month 
contract and into the next delivery month when there 
is clear evidence of rol l ing over practice. Normally, 
the spot month contract will ro l l out into the next 
9 » 
delivery month 5 days before the spot month 
expiration day. 
90 
Moreover, s t a r t ing from 1992, the futures 
exchange extended i t s trading hours to 3:45pm while 
the stock exchange s t i l l closed at 3:30pm. in th i s 
way, we should use the futures price at 3:30pm in 
order to avoid non-synchronous data problem. However, 
since the futures exchange did not record the index 
at that moment, we could only use the daily 
settlement price instead of the index at 3:30pm. For 
the e f f ec t on the conclusion drawn, please refers to 
chapter 3. 
Part B - Price Vola t i l i tv 
Data Required： Hang Seng Index, Cash market 
turnover, Futures trading volume 
and open in te res t 
HSI closing and turnover from the period of 2 
July 1985 to 31 Dec 1993 and HSI futures trading 
volume and open in te res t from the period of 6 May 
1986 to 31 Dec 1993 are employed. 
Because several HSI futures contracts with 
d i f f e r en t maturity are traded simultaneously, the 
trading volume and open in te res t are summed across 
a l l outstanding maturi t ies to get an aggregate 
measure of ac t i v i t y in HSI futures market. 
Part c - Margin Policy 
The period span from 6 May 198^ to 31 Dec 1993. 
Data Required: HSI Futures price and HSI Futures 
Margin level 
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